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Perryman: Agents of Bioshield

AGENTS OF BIOSHIELD: THE FDA,
EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATIONS, AND
PUBLIC TRUST
Kirstiana Perryman*
The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic spurred the U.S. Food & Drug
Administration (FDA) to utilize the Emergency Use Authorization
(EUA) procedure more than ever before. The pandemic pushed the
relatively obscure procedure into public consciousness, making it
a frequent topic of discussion and debate. The EUA procedure
permits the FDA Commissioner to authorize the introduction of
drugs, devices, or biological products into interstate commerce for
use in an actual or potential emergency. To issue an authorization,
the FDA Commissioner must determine that it is “reasonable to
believe,” based on the “totality of the evidence,” that the product
“may be effective.” This standard creates a lower evidentiary
burden than the traditional pathways to market for drugs and
vaccines in the United States, allowing the FDA to respond quickly
and effectively during public health emergencies (PHEs).
While the flexibility provided by the EUA procedure can and
has saved lives, aspects of the procedure can also exacerbate public
mistrust in the safety, rigor, and objectivity of FDA review and
authorization. Focusing solely on drugs and vaccine EUAs, this
Note builds off of existing scholarship to propose three
modifications to the EUA procedure: (1) the EUA procedure should
mandate that the FDA create and disseminate guidance as soon
as practicable after the declaration of a PHE; (2) Congress should
modify the evidentiary standard for vaccine EUAs; (3) the EUA
procedure should mandate that the FDA cite, in the authorization
letter, the evidence it relies upon when deciding to issue an EUA
and publicly release any data and studies that underlie its
decision. These modifications could yield pragmatic and positive
reform without unduly sacrificing the speed and centralized
authority the FDA needs to respond effectively to a PHE.
*
J.D. Candidate, 2022, University of Georgia School of Law; B.S., 2015, Emory University.
This Note is dedicated to my family and roommates, whose support made completing this
Note possible.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The 2019 coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic1 put the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration’s (FDA) Emergency Use Authorization
(EUA) power to the test. During the coronavirus pandemic, the FDA
issued more EUAs than ever before,2 causing EUAs to become a
frequent topic of public discussion and debate.3 The pandemic both
highlighted the immense benefits of the EUA power and revealed
some of its flaws. The EUA process provides the FDA the essential

1 The strain of virus that caused the pandemic is called SARS-CoV-2, and the name of the
disease caused by SARS-Cov-2 is called coronavirus disease 2019. See Coronavirus Disease
2019 (COVID-19), MAYO CLINIC (Nov. 5, 2021), https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseasesconditions/coronavirus/symptoms-causes/syc-20479963 (“Infection with the new coronavirus
(severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2, or SARS-CoV-2) causes coronavirus
disease 2019 (COVID-19).”). COVID-19 is the acronym for coronavirus disease 2019. Id.
2 As of this writing, the FDA has issued three vaccine EUAs and nine drug and non-vaccine
biological therapeutic EUAs. See Emergency Use Authorization, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
[hereinafter Current EUA Information], https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-andresponse/mcm-legal-regulatory-and-policy-framework/emergency-use-authorization
(last
updated Dec. 28, 2021) (listing three coronavirus vaccines and fourteen drug and biological
therapeutics for treatment of COVID-19 that have EUA status as of the writing this Note);
Emergency Use Authorization—Archived Information, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
[hereinafter
Archived
EUAs],
https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-andresponse/mcm-legal-regulatory-and-policy-framework/emergency-use-authorizationarchived-information (last updated Dec. 21, 2021) (noting that the chloroquine and
hydroxychloroquine EUA and the bamlanivimab EUA have been revoked, while an EUA for
bamlanivimab administered with estevimab remains effective). By contrast, the FDA issued
three antiviral EUAs for H1N1 and one vaccine EUA for anthrax. Archived EUAs, supra.
3 Compare Edmund DeMarche, FDA OKs Emergency Authorization of Drugs Touted by
NEWS
(Mar.
29,
2020),
Trump
to
Fight
Coronavirus,
FOX
https://www.foxnews.com/health/fda-oks-emergency-authorization-of-drugs-touted-bytrump-to-fight-coronavirus (“[President Trump] has touted drugs used in malaria cases as a
possible response to the coronavirus and now the Food and Drug Administration put in place
an emergency use authorization to try these drugs despite clear evidence of their
effectiveness.”), with Charles Piller, Former FDA Leaders Decry Emergency Authorization of
(Apr.
7,
2020),
Malaria
Drugs
for
Coronavirus,
SCI.
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/04/former-fda-leaders-decry-emergencyauthorization-malaria-drugs-coronavirus (“The recent Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) emergency use authorization (EUA) for two malaria drugs to treat COVID-19, based
on thin evidence of efficacy, has jeopardized research to learn the drugs’ real value against
the pandemic coronavirus, say former agency executives under President Donald Trump and
former President Barack Obama.”).
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ability to respond quickly to a public health emergency,4 but aspects
of the process can undermine public trust, confuse health
authorities, stymie important data collection efforts, and potentially
put individuals at unnecessary risk. These flaws are unlikely to
dissipate when the COVID-19 pandemic ends because scientists
predict that we will face more outbreaks like COVID-19 in the
coming years.5
This Note proposes three modifications that would improve the
EUA power while retaining its effective elements. First, the EUA
procedure should mandate that the FDA create and disseminate
guidance as soon as practicable after the declaration of a public
health emergency (PHE). Second, Congress should modify the
evidentiary standard for vaccine EUAs.6 Third, the EUA procedure
should mandate that the FDA specifically cite which evidence it
relies upon when deciding to issue an EUA and publicly release any
data underlying its decision.
Part II of this Note contrasts traditional FDA approval
procedures for drugs and vaccines with the EUA procedure.7 Part
See Patricia J. Zettler, Micah L. Berman & Efthimios Parasidis, Drug and Vaccine
Development and Access, in ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19 163, 165 (Scott
Burris et al. eds., 2020) (“The addition of the EUA mechanism . . . arguably reflects a societal
decision that FDA ought to have flexibility to lower standards of safety and effectiveness
during public health emergencies to speed access to promising, but unproven, products.”).
5 See Victoria Gill, Coronavirus: This Is Not the Last Pandemic, BBC (June 6, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-52775386 (describing how and why the
world will likely face more pandemics in the future); John D. Blum & Jordan Paradise, Public
Health Preparedness & Response: An Exercise in Administrative Law, DEPAUL J. HEALTH
CARE L., Spring 2018, at 1, 2 (“While public health experts are not able to pinpoint the time
and nature of the next ‘big event,’ there is a consensus that it is not a matter of ‘if’ but
‘when.’”).
6 While this Note critically discusses vaccine EUAs, it in no way questions the safety or
effectiveness of modern vaccines. As another J.D. candidate has noted in his insightful Note
regarding EUAs, “[v]accines are one of the safest and most effective public health
interventions ever invented.” Daniel Walsh, Note, COVID-19: A Crisis and an Opportunity to
Improve the Emergency Use Authorization Process, 22 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 169, 171 n.8
(2021).
7 Although the EUA procedure also allows the FDA Commissioner to issue EUAs for
medical devices, personal protective equipment (PPE), and diagnostic tests, this aspect of the
FDA’s powers is beyond the scope of this Note. For a comprehensive discussion of EUAs and
diagnostic tests, see Barbara J. Evans & Ellen Wright Clayton, Deadly Delay: The FDA’s Role
in America’s COVID-Testing Debacle, 130 YALE L.J.F. 78 (2020), arguing that the FDA does
not have the power to issue EUAs for COVID-related laboratory-developed diagnostic tests.
4
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III presents an overview of chemical, biological, radiological, or
nuclear (CBRN) emergencies during which the FDA has issued
EUAs for drugs or vaccines. Part IV first analyzes the benefits and
pitfalls of the EUA procedure as applied to drugs and vaccines and
then suggests possibilities for reform. Finally, Part V briefly
concludes.

II. OVERVIEW OF EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATIONS
This Part describes the EUA procedure through comparison with
the traditional pathways for obtaining FDA approval or licensing.
This comparison elucidates the unique aspects of the EUA
procedure, highlights its potential benefits, and indicates its
potential weaknesses.
A. THE ENABLING ACTS

The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and the
Public Health Service Act (PHSA) grant the FDA the power to
approve, license, or authorize drugs and biologics.8 Section 505(a) of
the FDCA requires that the FDA approve drugs prior to their
introduction into interstate commerce, stating that “[n]o person
shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce
any new drug, unless an approval of an application filed . . . is
effective with respect to such drug.”9 Similarly, Section 351 of the
PHSA requires that the FDA issue a biologics license prior to a
biologic’s “introduction into interstate commerce.”10 The statute
states that “[n]o person shall introduce or deliver for introduction
into interstate commerce any biological product unless . . . a

8 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (requiring approval of an application before the introduction of any
new drug into interstate commerce under the FDCA); 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (requiring a biologics
license before the introduction of any biological product into interstate commerce under the
PHSA); 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3 (permitting the FDA to authorize the introduction of a drug or
biologic into interstate commerce “for use in an actual or potential emergency (referred
to . . . as an ‘emergency use’)” under the FDCA). The HHS Secretary—granted authority
under these statutes—has delegated the EUA decision-making authority to the FDA
Commissioner. See infra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
9 21 U.S.C. § 355(a).
10 46 U.S.C. § 262(a).
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biologics license . . . is in effect for the biological product.”11 These
two statutory sections provide the “traditional new drug approval
process[es],” or the “general pathways to market,” for drugs and
biologics.12 By contrast, the EUA procedure is a newer and faster
pathway to market for drugs and biologics with vastly different
requirements.13 Section 564 of the FDCA empowers the FDA to
issue EUAs for both drugs and biologics, stating that “the Secretary
[of Health and Human Services] may authorize the introduction
into interstate commerce . . . of a drug, device, or biological product
intended for use in an actual or potential emergency (referred to in
this section as an ‘emergency use’).”14
The most obvious difference between the EUA procedure and the
traditional pathways to market is clear from the language of the
statutes: the EUA procedure is solely an emergency response,15
while the traditional pathways have no emergency requirement.16
An emergency situation drastically alters the FDA’s priorities,
requiring fast and decisive action.17 The differences between the
processes for obtaining FDA approval or licensing and the process
for obtaining an EUA further demonstrate this change in priorities.

Id.
Blum & Paradise, supra note 5, at 11.
13 See id. at 14–16 (describing the establishment of the EUA procedure in the Project
Bioshield Act of 2004, the “significant revisions and additions” the Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Reauthorization Act made to the procedure in 2013, and the key aspects of the
EUA procedure); Zettler et al., supra note 4 at 163–64 (explaining the FDA approval and preapproval access then elaborating upon the EUA procedure).
14 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(a)(1).
15 See id. (conditioning authorization on intended “use in an actual or potential
emergency”).
16 21 U.S.C. § 355; 42 U.S.C. § 262.
17 See, e.g., Zettler et al., supra note 4, at 165 (recognizing that, during a PHE, the FDA
still faces the need to develop “rigorous evidence of products’ safety and effectiveness” but
with “an urgent need to move as quickly as possible”); OFF. OF COUNTERTERRORISM &
EMERGING THREATS, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATION
OF MEDICAL PRODUCTS AND RELATED AUTHORITIES 8 (2017) [hereinafter 2017 FDA
GUIDANCE], https://www.fda.gov/media/97321/download (“FDA intends to assess the
potential effectiveness of a possible EUA product on a case-by-case basis using a risk-benefit
analysis . . . .”).
11
12

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol56/iss1/7

6

Perryman: Agents of Bioshield

2021] Agents of Bioshield: The FDA, EUAs, and Public Trust

347

B. FDA APPROVAL AND LICENSING

Under the traditional pathways for approval or licensing, drug
developers must first submit an Investigational New Drug (IND)
application to the FDA.18 An IND application requests
authorization from the FDA to begin clinical research testing of a
drug on humans.19 The IND must include animal study and toxicity
data, manufacturing information, clinical protocols, any data from
prior human research, and information about the developer.20 The
FDA approves the IND, delays the IND, or prohibits further
investigation of the drug or vaccine.21 After IND approval, the
developer can begin clinical trials.22 Clinical trials usually proceed
in four phases, and the FDA requires completion of Phase 3 trials—
which typically involve a significantly larger number of study
participants than the previous phases—before a developer can
apply for approval.23 Developers typically take several years to
complete Phase 1 through Phase 3.24

18 See, e.g., Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/types-applications/investigational-new-drug-ind-application (last
updated Feb. 24, 2021) (“Current Federal law requires that a drug be the subject of an
approved marketing application before it is transported or distributed across state lines. . . .
The IND is the means through which the sponsor technically obtains this exemption from the
FDA.”); Blum & Paradise, supra note 5, at 11 (“[A]n investigational new drug (‘IND’)
application . . . triggers the clinical trial process . . . .”).
19
Development & Approval Process (CBER), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/development-approval-process-cber
(last
updated Jan. 27, 2021); see also Step 3: Clinical Research, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/patients/drug-development-process/step-3-clinical-research
(last
updated Jan. 4, 2018) (describing IND design, review, and approval).
20 Step 3: Clinical Research, supra note 19.
21 Id. (“FDA responds to IND applications in one of two ways: [a]pproval to begin clinical
trials [or] [c]linical hold to delay or stop the investigation.”).
22 Id.
23 See Natalie M. Kase, Commentary, Do Right to Try Laws Undermine the FDA’s
Authority? An Examination of the Consequences of Unlimited Access to Unapproved Drugs,
36 J. LEGAL MED. 420, 422 (2015) (noting that a drug sponsor must complete three pre-market
phases of clinical trials before submitting a New Drug Application).
24 Step 3: Clinical Research, supra note 19. In Phase 1, the investigator tests varying
dosages to determine how great of a dosage trial participants can tolerate and whether the
drug or vaccine has any side effects. Id. In Phase 2, researchers test the drug’s efficacy and
obtain additional safety data. Id. Phase 3 trials typically involve a much larger number of
study participants than prior phases, and researchers continue to test the drug for efficacy
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After a drug developer has completed Phase 3 clinical trials, the
developer can submit a New Drug Application (NDA).25 The NDA
includes data gathered through the clinical trials and pre-clinical
animal studies.26 The Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
(CDER), a division of the FDA, then reviews the NDA.27 To obtain
approval for a new drug, a developer must show evidence of safety
and effectiveness based on “substantial evidence” derived from wellcontrolled clinical trials.28 If a developer demonstrates that the drug
is “safe and effective for [its] particular intended use, indication,
and patient population”29 and that the benefits of the drug outweigh
the risks, the FDA will approve the drug.30
and adverse reactions. Id. Phase 4, also known as post-marketing surveillance, occurs after
FDA approval. Id. During Phase 4, the investigator continues to monitor the safety of the
product, determine optimal dosages, or study populations underrepresented in the previous
phases. Stuart R. Cohn & Erin M. Swick, The Sitting Ducks of Securities Class Action
Litigation: Bio-Pharmas and the Need for Improved Evaluation of Scientific Data, 35 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 911, 922 (2010).
25
See
Step
4:
FDA
Drug
Review,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/patients/drug-development-process/step-4-fda-drug-review
(last
updated Jan. 4, 2018) (“A drug developer must include everything about a drug—from
preclinical data to Phase 3 trial data—in an NDA.”).
26
New
Drug
Application
(NDA),
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/types-applications/new-drug-application-nda (last updated June
10, 2019) (“The data gathered during the animal studies and human clinical trials of
an Investigational New Drug (IND) become part of the NDA.”).
27 See Development & Approval Process | Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-approval-process-drugs (last updated Oct. 28, 2019)
(“FDA approval of a drug means that data on the drug’s effects have been reviewed by
CDER.”).
28 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (requiring safety and effectiveness of drugs for approval); 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(d) (“[T]he term ‘substantial evidence’ means evidence consisting of adequate and wellcontrolled investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific
training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved . . . .”).
29 Blum & Paradise, supra note 5, at 11; see also Maureen C. Kelley & Samuel J. Tilden,
Ethical and Legal Oversight of Human Subjects Research in Emerging Infections and
Biodefense Research: A Review of Recent Changes and Call for Policy Reform, 8 HOUS. J.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 19 (2007) (“[FDA] [a]pprovals are based on clinical investigations of the
drug demonstrating its safety and effectiveness for the intended use.”).
30 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (requiring that an NDA demonstrate that the drug is “safe” and
“effective”); Development & Approval Process | Drugs, supra note 27 (“FDA approval of a drug
means that data on the drug’s effects have been reviewed[,] . . . and the drug is determined
to provide benefits that outweigh its known and potential risks for the intended population.”).
A developer can also obtain FDA approval by submitting an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA). See 21 U.S.C. 355(j) (“Any person may file with the Secretary [of Health
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To obtain a biologics license, vaccine developers must submit a
Biologics License Application (BLA), which also includes data from
pre-clinical trials and clinical trials.31 The Center for Biologics
Evaluations and Research (CBER), a division of the FDA, evaluates
the BLA.32 To obtain a biologics license, the developer must show
that the biologic is safe, pure, and potent.33 Through the safe, pure,
and potent standard, “the FDA applies general concepts of safety

and Human Services] an abbreviated application for the approval of a new drug.”). The FDA
will approve the ANDA if the developer shows bioequivalence to a drug that already has FDA
approval, meaning that its active ingredients and conditions for use match those of an
approved drug. Id.; Blum & Paradise, supra note 5, at 11 (“[T]he abbreviated new drug
application (‘ANDA’) process, also termed the generic drug approval process [is] premised on
measures of bioequivalence to a reference drug product already approved by the FDA.”). This
is commonly referred to as the generic drug approval process. Id.
31 See Biologics License Application (BLA) Process (CBER), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/development-approval-process-cber/biologicslicense-applications-bla-process-cber (last updated Jan. 27, 2021) (describing the BLA process
and requirements). Like the ANDA, biologics developers can also seek approval through the
Abbreviated Biologics Approval License Application (ABLA). See 46 U.S.C. § 262(k) (outlining
the requirements for licensure of a biosimilar or interchangeable biological product); Blum &
Paradise, supra note 5, at 12 (listing the ABLA as a route to FDA approval).
32 See Development & Approval Process (CBER), supra note 19 (listing applications that
CBER is responsible for reviewing, including the BLA). BLAs for certain other biological
products are reviewed by CDER, including, for example, monoclonal antibodies, proteins
intended for therapies, and growth factors. Scientific Writing Team, What are the Regulatory
Differences Between an NDA and BLA?, NUVENTRA PHARMA SCIS. (Apr. 15, 2020),
https://www.nuventra.com/resources/blog/regulatory-differences-between-an-nda-bla/.
33 See 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (“The Secretary [of Health and Human Services] shall approve a
biologics license application . . . on the basis of a demonstration that . . . the biological product
that is the subject of the application is safe, pure, and potent . . . .”); 21 C.F.R. § 601.2(a)
(2021) (“To obtain a biologics license under section 351 of the Public Health Service Act for
any biological product, the manufacturer . . . shall submit data derived from nonclinical
laboratory and clinical studies which demonstrate that the manufactured product meets
prescribed requirements of safety, purity, and potency . . . .”); id. § 600.3(p) (“The
word safety means the relative freedom from harmful effect to persons affected, directly or
indirectly, by a product when prudently administered, taking into consideration the character
of the product in relation to the condition of the recipient at the time.”); id. § 600.3(r)
(“Purity means relative freedom from extraneous matter in the finished product, whether or
not harmful to the recipient or deleterious to the product.”); id. § 600.3(s) (“The
word potency is interpreted to mean the specific ability or capacity of the product, as indicated
by appropriate laboratory tests or by adequately controlled clinical data obtained through the
administration of the product in the manner intended, to effect a given result.”).
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and efficacy to biologics, though the regulations are highly specific
to biologics.”34
C. EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATION

Before Congress empowered the FDA to use the EUA
procedure,35 the FDA could only authorize the large-scale
administration of unapproved products, or unapproved use of
approved products, under the IND treatment protocol.36 The IND
treatment protocol requires, in part, “Institutional Review Board
(IRB) approval of the investigational protocol, documented informed
consent from all patients describing, among other things, the
research purposes of the protocol, substantial record keeping, and
patient follow-up requirements.”37 While the IND protocol works
34 Blum & Paradise, supra note 5, at 12. For example, “potency” includes substantial
evidence of effectiveness. See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RSCH., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS., DEMONSTRATING SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR HUMAN DRUG
AND BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS 3–4 (2019) (“Potency has long been interpreted to include
effectiveness. FDA has also generally considered ‘substantial evidence’ of effectiveness to be
necessary to support licensure of a biological product under section 351 of the PHS Act.”
(citation omitted)).
35 The EUA process was first authorized in 2004 by the Project BioShield Act. See Blum &
Paradise, supra note 5, at 14 (describing legislation relevant to FDA authority).
36 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(b) (2003) (“FDA shall permit an investigational drug to be used
for a treatment use under a treatment protocol or treatment IND if: (i) The drug is intended
to treat a serious or immediately life-threatening disease; (ii) There is no comparable or
satisfactory alternative drug or other therapy available to treat that stage of the disease in
the intended patient population; (iii) The drug is under investigation in a controlled clinical
trial under an IND in effect for the trial, or all clinical trials have been completed; and (iv)
The sponsor of the controlled clinical trial is actively pursuing marketing approval of the
investigational drug with due diligence.”); Gail H. Javitt, Old Legacies and New Paradigms:
Confusing “Research” and “Treatment” and Its Consequences in Responding to Emergent
Health Threats, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 38, 41 (2005) (“FDA had . . . authorized the
administration of IND products for treatment purposes . . . .”).
37 Stuart L. Nightingale, Joanna M. Prasher & Stewart Simonson, Emergency Use
Authorization (EUA) to Enable Use of Needed Products in Civilian and Military Emergencies,
United States, 13 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1046, 1046–47 (2007). An IRB is a
committee tasked with reviewing and approving scientific study protocols for research on
humans. See, e.g., Sharona Hoffman & Jessica Wilen Berg, The Suitability of IRB Liability,
67 U. PITT. L. REV. 365, 372 (2005) (“Federal regulations mandate that all research that is
conducted, supported, or regulated by HHS, the FDA, or another federal agency must be
overseen by an IRB, a committee constituted to provide initial approval and periodic
monitoring for biomedical research studies.” (footnote omitted)).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol56/iss1/7

10

Perryman: Agents of Bioshield

2021] Agents of Bioshield: The FDA, EUAs, and Public Trust

351

well for clinical trials or individual authorizations, it is too rigorous
to allow fast, large-scale action during an emergency.38
As part of its response to the 2001 terrorist and anthrax attacks,
Congress introduced the EUA pathway in the Project BioShield Act
of 2004.39 Congress then amended the EUA process several times.40
EUAs provide a mechanism to grant rapid access to medical
countermeasures during an emergency, particularly when the
benefits of a product might outweigh the costs of following
traditional approval procedures.41 By removing some of the
procedural safeguards in the traditional approval and licensing
pathway, the EUA process empowers qualified actors to make
judgment calls and respond quickly to an emergency.42
The FDA can issue an EUA for “an unapproved medical product
or an unapproved use of an approved medical product.”43 Before the

For example, the FDA utilized the IND protocol to offer emergency access to drugs and
an anthrax vaccine during the 2001 anthrax attacks. Nightingale et al., supra note 37, at
1047. The IND use of the anthrax vaccine “highlighted substantial shortcomings with [the
IND] approach” for emergency authorizations because its focus on controlled clinical research
and its administrative burdens could not adequately address the needs of a population during
a CBRN emergency. See id. (“The country needed an emergency mechanism built not on a
clinical research model, but on a public health model.”).
39 See Project BioShield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835; Megan
O’Reilly, Case Brief, The Failures of Project BioShield & Congressional Attempts to Remedy
It, 10 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 503, 503 (2007) (“In response to the 2001 terrorist attacks,
the United States government began a crash program to develop drugs, vaccine and
diagnostic tests to protect the nation from biological terrorism.”); Robert P. Baird, Can Trump
Really Speed Approval of Covid Treatments?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/10/health/covid-vaccine-treatment-fda-emergency.html
(“In the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, and especially the anthrax mailings later that
year, it was widely acknowledged that even the agency’s fastest approval mechanisms were
too slow and inflexible to handle a true emergency.”).
40 See, e.g., Blum & Paradise, supra note 5, at 14–16 (noting that “[t]he emergency use
authorization (‘EUA’) procedure was first introduced in the Project Bioshield Act of 2004 and
subsequently amended through legislation” and describing the amendments).
41 See, e.g., Kelley & Tilden, supra note 29, at 18–20 (describing how EUAs allow the FDA
to bypass traditional measures for protecting human subjects through IRBs).
42 See, e.g., Zettler et al., supra note 4, at 165 (“The addition of the EUA mechanism to the
FDCA arguably reflects a societal decision that FDA ought to have flexibility to lower
standards of safety and effectiveness during public health emergencies to speed access to
promising, but unproven, products.”).
43 OFF. OF COUNTERTERRORISM & EMERGING THREATS, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATION OF MEDICAL PRODUCTS AND RELATED AUTHORITIES 3 (2017)
38
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FDA Commissioner issues an EUA, two actions must occur.44 First,
either the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services (HHS), or the Secretary of Homeland Security must
determine that an emergency, or the significant potential for an
emergency, exists.45 Second, upon such a determination, the HHS
Secretary must declare that circumstances exist that justify
emergency authorized use of medical products.46 Although Section
564 of the FDCA authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to issue EUAs,47 the Secretary has delegated the decisionmaking authority to the FDA.48 The FDA Commissioner may then
issue an EUA if, after consultation with the Assistant Secretary for
Preparedness and Response, the Director of the National Institutes
of Health, and the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, the Commissioner concludes that the product meets
certain statutory criteria.49 The HHS Secretary retains the power to
override an FDA EUA decision, but this has yet to occur.50
To issue an EUA, the following criteria must be satisfied: (1) the
CBRN agent referred to in the emergency declaration must be
capable of causing “a serious or life-threatening disease or
condition”; (2) the FDA Commissioner must find that it is
reasonable, “based on the totality of scientific evidence,” to believe
that “the product may be effective in diagnosing, treating, or
preventing” the disease or condition and that the benefits of using
the product outweigh the risks; (3) there must be “no adequate,

[hereinafter
2017
FDA
GUIDANCE]
(footnote
omitted),
https://www.fda.gov/media/97321/download.
44 See 21 U.S.C § 360bbb-3 (specifying the prerequisites for EUA issuance); 2017 FDA
GUIDANCE, supra note 43, at 5–6 (elaborating on the EUA procedure).
45 2017 FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 43, at 5.
46 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(b)–(c).
47 21 U.S.C § 360bbb-3(b)(1).
48 See 2017 FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 43, at 3 n.6 (“[T]he Secretary of Health and Human
Services (HHS Secretary or Secretary of HHS) has delegated most of the authorities under
sections 564, 564A, and 564B to the Commissioner of FDA (Commissioner).”).
49 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(c). The FDA Commissioner must only consult with the Assistant
Secretary for Preparedness and Response, the Director of the National Institutes of Health,
and the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention “to the extent feasible and
appropriate given the applicable circumstances.” Id.
50 See Zettler et al., supra note 4, at 164 (noting that because “the FDA is an agency within
HHS,” the HHS secretary can override FDA decisions but rarely does).
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approved” alternative product; and (4) any additional criteria
imposed by applicable regulations must be satisfied.51
Upon issuance of an EUA, the HHS Secretary must “promptly
publish in the Federal Register a notice of each authorization . . .
and an explanation of the reasons therefor.”52 Additionally, the FDA
must make “any revisions to an authorization under this section
available on the Internet Web site of the Food and Drug
Administration.”53 The FDA must periodically review the
authorization and retains the power to revoke or terminate the EUA
whenever it determines that it is no longer reasonable to believe
that the product may be effective.54 A notice of a termination or
revocation must also be published in the Federal Register.55 Upon a
determination that the CBRN emergency is over, all EUAs will
terminate.56
D. COMPARISON

While there are many differences between the traditional
pathways and the EUA pathway, the most important differences
relate to evidentiary requirements, decision-making, and speed of
authorization. First, the EUA procedure presents a significantly
lower evidentiary burden than the traditional pathways do.57 While
developers must show that a drug is safe and effective or a vaccine
“is safe, pure, and potent” to obtain FDA approval or licensing,58 a
developer must only show that a drug or vaccine “may be effective”

51 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(c) (emphasis added); see also 2017 FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 43,
at 7–8 (describing the criteria as (1) serious or life-threatening disease or condition, (2)
evidence of effectiveness, (3) risk-benefit analysis, and (4) no alternatives).
52 21 U.S.C § 360bbb-3(h)(1).
53 Id.
54 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(b)(2), (g)(1)–(2).
55 See 2017 FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 43, at 29–30 (describing the publication protocol for
EUAs).
56 See id. at 6 (“The HHS Secretary’s EUA declaration will terminate on . . . a determination
by the HHS Secretary that the circumstances that precipitated the declaration have
ceased . . . .”).
57 See Kelley & Tilden, supra note 29, at 12 (noting that the legal standards for emergency
use authorizations “are less stringent than provided by the investigational new drug
regulations”).
58 21 U.S.C. § 355(b); 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (emphasis added).
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to obtain an EUA.59 FDA approval and licensing also require
“substantial evidence” of safety and effectiveness, which includes
completion of Phase 3 clinical trials.60 Clinical investigations, as
required by NDAs and BLAs, must have IRB review and approved
informed consent procedures.61 By contrast, the FDA Commissioner
must only find that “it is reasonable to believe” that the product
“may be effective,”62 and EUAs do not require completion of clinical
trials prior to issuance.63 No IRB review of the EUA trials is
required, but the FDA can seek IRB review if it desires.64
Additionally, unlike the traditional approval pathways, where
CDER or CBER evaluates the drug or vaccine based on clinical and
pre-clinical trial results, the FDA Commissioner can consult a
variety of additional sources when evaluating the drug or vaccine
for EUA.65 These sources do not have to be well-controlled scientific
trials and can include incomplete studies or guidelines from other
countries.66 As some commentators have noted, “[t]he addition of
21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(c) (emphasis added).
See supra notes 24, 28.
61 See Kelley & Tilden, supra note 29, at 19–20 (describing the typical IRB procedure for
FDA drug approval).
62 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(c)(2) (emphasis added); see also Zettler et al., supra note 4, at 164
(commenting that the bar for EUA is lower than that of traditional FDA approval).
63 See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(k) (“If a product is the subject of an authorization under this
section, the use of such product within the scope of the authorization shall not be considered
to constitute a clinical investigation . . . .”); Kelley & Tilden, supra note 29, at 19 (“[O]ne can
surmise that [through EUAs] unapproved products and unapproved uses of approved
products, which clearly are experimental in nature, have effectively been removed from
traditional review by institutional review boards.”).
64 See Kelley & Tilden, supra note 29, at 20 (emphasizing that IRB review is discretionary
for EUAs).
65 See 2017 FDA Guidance, supra note 43, at 14–15 (listing examples of the types of
evidence the FDA Commissioner may consider); see also, e.g., CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION
AND RSCH., (CDER) REVIEW, EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATION (EUA) FOR CHLOROQUINE
PHOSPHATE, AN UNAPPROVED PRODUCT AND HYDROXYCHLOROQUINE SULFATE, AN
UNAPPROVED USE OF AN APPROVED PRODUCT 6 (2020) [hereinafter CHLOROQUINE &
HYDROXYCHLOROQUINE
CDER
REVIEW],
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6933189-LEOPOLD-FDA-FOIAHydroxychloroquine-study.html (citing Chinese and Korean guidelines recommending
chloroquine or hydroxychloroquine for coronavirus treatment).
66 See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(c) (allowing the HHS Secretary to issue an authorization “based
on the totality of scientific evidence available”); see also 2017 FDA Guidance, supra note 43,
at 8 (“FDA intends to look at the totality of the scientific evidence to make an overall riskbenefit determination. Such evidence, which could arise from a variety of sources, may
59
60
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the EUA mechanism to the FDCA arguably reflects a societal
decision that FDA ought to have flexibility to lower standards of
safety and effectiveness during public health emergencies to speed
access to promising, but unproven, products.”67
These differing evidentiary requirements and decision-making
standards support one of the EUA procedure’s key benefits: the
speed of authorization.68 The FDA typically requires at least a few
months to review an NDA or BLA prior to issuing its decision on
approval or licensing, and the process of completing Phase 3 clinical
trials takes years.69 By contrast, the FDA typically decides whether
to issue EUAs within weeks.70 As mentioned, developers seeking
authorization do not need to complete clinical trials and can instead
submit preliminary data from clinical trials or data from other
trials.71 This expedited decision-making process is critical during a
CBRN emergency when time is of the essence, but removing
safeguards and granting more discretionary power to key players
raises concerns with safety, ethics, and political influence.72
Last, EUAs differ from the traditional processes because they
must be used during CBRN emergencies, are limited in time and
scope, and are easily revocable.73 The EUA procedure allows the
FDA to respond quickly and flexibly to a CBRN emergency in a way
that would be impossible with only the traditional routes for FDA
approval, but it sacrifices some of the traditional routes’ scientific

include (but is not limited to): results of domestic and foreign clinical trials, in vivo efficacy
data from animal models, and in vitro data, available for FDA consideration.”).
67 Zettler et al., supra note 4, at 165.
68 See id. (noting that EUAs increase the speed at which access to products is granted).
69 See, e.g., JAMA Network, Coronavirus Vaccine Update from the FDA – October 5, 2020,
YOUTUBE (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=43XAc5iDN9k (discussing the
differences between EUAs and traditional FDA approval with the director of the FDA’s
CBER).
70 See id. at 23:35–23:54 (“It’s probably going to take a matter of weeks [to issue an
EUA] . . . . [W]e’re talking about weeks as opposed to months. A biologics license application,
even a very well put together one, will take us a few months at least . . . .”).
71 See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text.
72 See Zettler et al., supra note 4, at 165 (mentioning concerns surrounding the EUA
procedure and “developing rigorous evidence of products’ safety and effectiveness,”
“tremendous political pressure,” and “providing equitable access to COVID-19
countermeasures”).
73 See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text.
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and ethical safeguards to achieve this goal.74 The EUAs issued by
the FDA since the creation of the EUA pathway in 2004 illustrate
the strengths and weakness of the EUA procedure. Part III
examines these EUAs.

III. EUAS IN PRACTICE
Since 2011, the FDA has issued various EUAs for emergencies
and potential emergencies including H1N1 (swine flu), Middle East
Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV), Ebola virus, Zika
virus, and, most recently, COVID-19.75 The COVID-19 pandemic,
however, put the EUA power to the ultimate test, presenting the
greatest CBRN emergency since the procedure was established and
spurring the FDA to issue more EUAs than for any other CBRN
emergency.76 This Part provides a brief synopsis of various CBRN
emergencies during which the FDA has issued EUAs for drugs or
vaccines. Examining these CBRN emergencies demonstrates the
strengths and weaknesses of the EUA procedure and illuminates a
path for effective reform.
A. ANTHRAX

In 2005, the FDA issued the first EUA for Anthrax Vaccine
Adsorbed (AVA).77 Before the 2005 EUA, in response to the 2001
anthrax attacks, the FDA offered emergency access to the anthrax
vaccine through the IND process.78 Few people opted to receive the
See supra notes 60–67 and accompanying text.
See Archived EUAs, supra note 2 (listing CBRN emergencies for which EUAs have been
issued).
76 Id. (illustrating the numerous EUAs issued for COVID-19 in comparison to previous
CBRN emergencies).
77 See Authorization of Emergency Use of Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed for Prevention of
Inhalation Anthrax by Individuals at Heightened Risk of Exposure Due to Attack with
Anthrax; Availability, 70 Fed. Reg. 5452 (Feb. 2, 2005) (announcing the EUA for AVA); Sarah
Zhang, What the ‘Emergency’ Blood-Plasma Debacle Reveals, ATLANTIC (Aug. 26, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/08/the-emergency-use-loophole/615679/
(“[T]he FDA ended up issuing an EUA before reaffirming the vaccine’s safety and efficacy in
a formal review.”).
78 See Sandra Crouse Quinn, Tammy Thomas & Supriya Kumar, The Anthrax Vaccine and
Research: Reactions from Postal Workers and Public Health Professionals, 6 BIOSECURITY &
74
75
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vaccine due to factors such as reduced trust in public health
agencies, public controversy and debate surrounding the vaccine’s
safety and necessity, differing levels of risk perception, and “mixed
and changing messages” from public health agencies.79 The
Department of Defense (DoD) also vaccinated a number of military
personnel with AVA prior to the 2005 EUA issuance.80 As a result
of AVA’s unapproved status, the DoD faced substantial litigation
and criticism of its vaccination program.81 In 2004, a federal court
issued an injunction against the DoD vaccination program.82 In
response, the Deputy Defense Secretary requested an EUA,83 which
the FDA Commissioner granted after following the EUA procedure
and consulting with the directors of the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC).84
The AVA EUA required, among other things, that the DoD advise
military members of their right to refuse the vaccine without facing
adverse consequences, thereby addressing some of the objections
brought in the litigation.85 The EUA allowed the DoD to continue
vaccinations by providing a legal pathway for the FDA to grant

BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC. & SCI. 321, 321–22 (2008) (discussing the
CDC’s plan to offer certain at-risk groups the anthrax vaccine through the IND).
79 Id. at 323, 325; see also id. at 330 (“In 2001, public health professionals were unprepared
for the vaccine recommendation, and agencies did not have consensus about its use, which
contributed to further distrust and suspicion among postal workers [offered the vaccine].”).
80 See Nightingale et al., supra note 37, at 1050 (“Since 1998, to protect against the threat
of anthrax attack, the armed forces have vaccinated a substantial number of their members
with AVA . . . .”).
81 See id. (noting that the military AVA vaccination program “has had detractors and has
been the subject of litigation” and detailing the litigation); Quinn et al., supra note 78, at 326
(discussing negative reactions by postal workers to the military’s use of AVA).
82 See Nightingale et al., supra note 37, at 1050 (“In late 2004, a federal court issued an
injunction against the DoD program on the grounds that the FDA should have obtained public
comments before issuing a determination confirming that the AVA license included use for
prevention of inhalation anthrax.”).
83 See id. (“Then Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz . . . determined . . . that there
was a significant potential for a military emergency involving anthrax and requested that an
EUA be issued for AVA.”).
84 Id.
85 See id. (“[T]he EUA . . . required DoD to inform military members that they had an option
to refuse the vaccine and that no adverse action would be taken against those who declined
the vaccine under the EUA.”).
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access to the vaccine.86 The EUA terminated on January 14, 2006,
when the FDA pronounced the AVA safe and effective for people at
high risk of anthrax exposure in a formal review.87 Ultimately, the
EUA process provided the government with a pathway to respond
quickly to the anthrax emergency, rather than face the additional
administrative burdens of an IND.88
B. H1N1

On April 26, 2009, HHS declared the H1N1 pandemic,
colloquially referred to as the swine flu pandemic, a public health
emergency.89 The FDA issued EUAs for two antivirals in August of
2009,90 followed by a third EUA for another antiviral in November
of 2009.91 These EUAs likely helped to mitigate the morbidity and
mortality of H1N1.92 However, some local health departments

86 See id. (“The issuance of this EUA cleared the way for DoD to resume anthrax
vaccinations to protect military personnel assigned to certain higher threat areas.”).
87 See Termination, By Expiration, of Declaration of Emergency Justifying Emergency Use
Authorization of Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed, 71 Fed. Reg. 5341 (Feb. 1, 2006) (announcing
the termination of the AVA EUA).
88 Using the EUA specifically to require military vaccination or to circumvent court orders
presents serious ethical issues that are beyond the scope of this note. See Kelley & Tilden,
supra note 29, at 22 (“[The AVA EUA] foreshadows the serious ethical and legal issues that
would arise in the event of a public health emergency due to a naturally occurring outbreak
or bioterrorist attack.”).
89 See Wendy E. Parmet, Pandemics, Populism and the Role of Law in the H1N1 Vaccine
Campaign, 4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 113, 120–23 (2010) (detailing the
governmental response to the H1N1 pandemic). H1N1 was a novel type of influenza, so few
young people had existing immunity. See 2009 H1N1 Pandemic (H1N1pdm09 virus), CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/2009h1n1-pandemic.html (last updated June 11, 2019) (providing an overview of the 2009 H1N1
pandemic statistics). From April 2009 to March 2010, there were about 60 million cases of
H1N1, resulting in about 270,000 hospitalizations and about 12,270 deaths in the United
States. Michael A. Jhung et al., Epidemiology of 2009 Pandemic Influenza A (H1N1) in the
United States, 52 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 13, 23 (2011).
90 See Archived EUAs, supra note 2 (listing EUAs issued by the FDA for Tamiflu and
Relenza in response to H1N1).
91 See id. (denoting an EUA issued by the FDA for Peramivir to treat H1N1).
92 See Brooke Courtney, Five Legal Preparedness Challenges for Responding to Future
Public Health Emergencies, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 60, 60 (2011) (“These authorizations gave
public health and medical practitioners additional, important tools to mitigate H1N1-related
morbidity and mortality.”). A 2014 study later indicated that Peramivir may not be effective,
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struggled to obtain the EUA drugs and accompanying literature
that specified the EUA conditions and content.93 Although a
company eventually produced a vaccine and received full FDA
approval—not an EUA—in mid-September of 2009, the vaccine was
not widely available until the second wave of infection had begun to
recede.94 The FDA approved the H1N1 vaccine without full clinical
trials, stating that the vaccine did not differ fundamentally from the
seasonal flu vaccine.95 One study concluded that if H1N1
vaccinations had begun two weeks earlier, the vaccine would have
prevented 59% more cases than the base estimate.96 The vaccine
faced public fears that it was untested or unsafe, which were
possibly exacerbated by the vaccine’s lack of full clinical trials and

but the study had to be terminated due to lack of a sufficient sample size. See Menno D. de
Jong et al., Evaluation of Intravenous Peramivir for Treatment of Influenza in Hospitalized
Patients, 59 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 172, 172 (2014) (“A significant clinical benefit
was not demonstrated for peramivir plus [Standard of Care] compared with placebo plus
[Standard of Care]. Peramivir was generally safe and well tolerated. These findings highlight
the challenges in designing studies to evaluate influenza antiviral agents in a hospitalized
setting.”); Zhang, supra note 77 (“The [FDA] learned a lesson—better to do the
trial during the pandemic. That way, [a former acting chief scientist for the FDA] said, ‘we
can actually learn quickly enough which drugs have merit and which ones don’t that we can
actually alter the course of the pandemic.’”).
93 See Courtney, supra note 92, at 60–61 (“[S]ome health departments have noted that they
do not have advance access to EUA content and conditions because EUAs are issued at the
time of the emergency.”).
94 See Parmet, supra note 89, at 119–23 (“[M]ost people who wanted to be vaccinated could
not be [in early November 2009]. . . . [I]n December 2009, as supplies picked up, the CDC
announced two voluntary ‘non-safety’ recalls of H1N1 vaccine. Meanwhile, worries about the
pandemic abated, as the dreaded second wave appeared no more virulent than the first.”
(footnotes omitted)); see also Rebekah H. Borse et al., Effects of Vaccine Program Against
Pandemic Influenza A(H1N1) Virus, United States, 2009–2010, 19 EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 439, 447 (2013) (“The major factor influencing the effects of the 2009 subtype H1N1
vaccination program was that the amount of vaccine available early in the epidemic (when
the effects of vaccination would be greatest) was limited.”).
95 See Parmet, supra note 89, at 131 (“[T]he FDA licensed the H1N1 vaccine . . . without
waiting for full clinical trials, reasoning that the vaccine was not fundamentally different
than the seasonal flu vaccine.”).
96 See Borse et al., supra note 94, at 444–45 (“If [the vaccinations] had begun 2 weeks earlier
than the actual date, the number of cases prevented would have been ≈59% greater than the
base estimate; moving the program ahead by 8 weeks would have resulted in a ≈306%
increase in cases prevented compared with the base estimate.”).
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public discussions regarding whether the FDA should grant an
H1N1 vaccine EUA.97
C. SARS-COV-2

On January 31, 2020, the HHS Secretary declared the
coronavirus pandemic a PHE.98 While the FDA faced criticism for
its slow issuance of EUAs for diagnostics following the declaration,99
the EUAs for drugs and biological products garnered particular
media attention and criticism.100
1. Chloroquine and Hydroxychloroquine. On March 19, 2020,
President Trump directed the FDA to expedite testing of certain
medicines to treat COVID-19, mentioning the drugs chloroquine
and hydroxychloroquine, as well as remdesivir.101 Less than ten
days later, the FDA issued an EUA for chloroquine and

See Parmet, supra note 89, at 131–32 (“[T]he discussion of a possible EUA, and the
decision to license the vaccine without full testing, may have helped to fuel a public perception
that the vaccine was rushed and untested.”).
98 Public Health Emergency Declarations, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/phe/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Nov.
2, 2021).
99 See Evans & Clayton, supra note 7, at 78–79 (“When a contaminated reagent slowed
deployment of a COVID-19 test from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
other entities such as diagnostic test manufacturers and research, clinical, and public health
laboratories were poised to fill the void. Actions by the FDA [using the EUA procedure]
allegedly delayed or even halted some of their efforts.”).
100 See, e.g., Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Institutionalizing the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention’s Independence, 12 CONLAWNOW 107, 120 (2020) (“The concern that the
administration will directly intervene in CDC’s professional decisions is not a hypothetical
concern: there is strong evidence that influence by the administration had a role in the FDA’s
choice to give an emergency use authorization (EUA) to hydroxychloroquine.”); Piller, supra
note 3 (describing criticism by former FDA officials of the hydroxychloroquine EUA).
101 See Thomas M. Burton, Andrew Restuccia & Jared S. Hopkins, U.S. Moves to Expand
Array of Drug Therapies Deployed Against Coronavirus, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 19, 2020, 3:00 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-expected-to-detail-new-virus-therapies-but-expansioncould-be-controversial-11584629965 (“Mr. Trump specifically mentioned two drugs,
chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine, that have long been used for malaria but aren’t
approved for the coronavirus, as well as an antiviral drug, remdesivir, that is currently being
tested in clinical research on Covid-19, the coronavirus disease.”).
97
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hydroxychloroquine.102 In the EUA letter, the FDA cited to “limited
in-vitro and anecdotal clinical data in case series” and noted that “a
number
of
national
guidelines
report
incorporating
recommendations regarding use of chloroquine phosphate or
hydroxychloroquine sulfate in the setting of COVID-19.”103 The
EUA letter did not state which specific studies or guidelines the
FDA examined when reaching its decision.104
A subsequent review, released at a later date in response to a
Freedom of Information Act request, indicated that the EUA relied
upon a French study, a Chinese study, Chinese and Korean
guidelines, sixteen ongoing clinical trials, and the clinical
community’s “substantial interest” in trying the drugs for COVID19 treatment.105 The French study that the FDA utilized was
controversial; it involved only thirty-six patients and was open-label
and nonrandomized.106 The journal that published the French study
later issued a statement explaining that the study did not meet the

102 Letter from Denise M. Hinton, Chief Scientist, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Rick Bright,
Dir., Biomed. Advanced Rsch. & Dev. Auth. 2 (Mar. 28, 2020) [hereinafter Chloroquine and
Hydroxychloroquine EUA], https://www.fda.gov/media/136534/download.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 CHLOROQUINE & HYDROXYCHLOROQUINE CDER REVIEW, supra note 65; see Kyle
Thomson & Herschel Nachlis, Emergency Use Authorizations During the COVID-19
Pandemic: Lessons from Hydroxychloroquine for Vaccine Authorization and Approval, 324
JAMA 1282, 1282–83 (2020) (criticizing the evidence relied upon for the hydroxychloroquine
EUA). The EUA did recognize, however, that “[b]ecause of the limitations and inconsistencies
of the available data, continuation and expansion of assessment in well-designed clinical
trials is considered to be highly important, at the same time that emergency uses of these
products in carefully selected crisis settings might be considered.” CHLOROQUINE &
HYDROXYCHLOROQUINE CDER REVIEW, supra note 65.
106 See Philippe Gautret, et al., Hydroxychloroquine and Azithromycin as a Treatment of
COVID-19: Results of an Open-Label Non-Randomized Clinical Trial, INT’L J. ANTIMICROBIAL
AGENTS, July 2020, at 1, 3 (describing the study methods). An open-label study is a study in
which participants are aware of whether or not they receive treatment, as compared to a
placebo study in which participants are unaware. Open Label Study, NIH,
https://www.cancer.gov/publications/dictionaries/cancer-terms/def/open-label-study
(last
visited
Nov.
2,
2021);
Placebos
in
Clinical
Trials,
NIH,
https://www.nia.nih.gov/health/placebos-clinical-trials (last visited Nov. 2, 2021). A
nonrandomized study is a study in which participants are not assigned by random chance to
different
treatments.
See
Nonrandomized
Clinical
Trial,
NIH,
https://www.cancer.gov/publications/dictionaries/cancer-terms/def/nonrandomized-clinicaltrial (last visited Nov. 2, 2021).
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journal’s publication standard.107 The FDA also referred to a “brief
report”—not data or preliminary findings—“from a Chinese study
of 100 COVID-19 patients [that] reported clinical improvement with
chloroquine or hydroxychloroquine treatment versus an unspecified
control.”108
A variety of former FDA officials criticized the EUA, saying that
it fell far below the evidentiary standards used for other therapeutic
EUAs.109 Further political controversy emerged when the former
director of the Biomedical Advanced Research Development
Authority (BARDA), Rick Bright, claimed that he was pressured
into approving the EUA.110 On June 15, 2020, the FDA revoked the
authorization after a number of studies indicated that chloroquine
and hydroxychloroquine were not effective in reducing the mortality
or morbidity of COVID-19 and that the drug increased risks for a
variety of adverse health consequences, including serious cardiac
adverse events.111 Subsequently, President Trump continued to
advocate publicly in favor of using the drug.112
107 See Andreas Voss, Official Statement from International Society of Antimicrobial
Chemotherapy (ISAC), INT’L SOC’Y ANTIMICROBIAL CHEMOTHERAPY (Apr. 3, 2020),
https://www.isac.world/news-and-publications/official-isac-statement (“The ISAC Board
believes the [Gautret et al.] article does not meet the Society’s expected standard, especially
relating to the lack of better explanations of the inclusion criteria and the triage of patients
to ensure patient safety.”).
108 CHLOROQUINE & HYDROXYCHLOROQUINE CDER REVIEW, supra note 65. For the original
report cited, see Jianjun Gao, Zhenxue Tian & Xu Yang, Breakthrough: Chloroquine
Phosphate Has Shown Apparent Efficacy in Treatment of COVID-19 Associated Pneumonia
TRENDS
72
(2020),
in
Clinical
Studies,
14
BIOSCIENCE
https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/bst/14/1/14_2020.01047/_pdf/-char/en.
109 See, e.g., Piller, supra note 3 (noting that former FDA executives criticized the
hydroxychloroquine EUA for weak evidence of efficacy and for appearing to bow to political
influence).
110 See Zettler et al., supra note 4, at 165 (“FDA issued the [hydroxychloroquine and
chloroquine] EUAs only nine days after the president publicly touted the drugs as COVID-19
countermeasures and, according to a whistleblower complaint from the former director of
[BARDA], at the secretary of HHS’s direction—raising significant concerns about political
interference in public health decision making.”).
111 See Letter from Denise M. Hinton, Chief Scientist, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Gary
L. Disbrow, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, BARDA, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (June 15, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/media/138945/download (revoking the EUA for hydroxychloroquine).
112 See Ben Gittleson, Jordyn Phelps & Libby Cathey, Trump Doubles Down on Defense of
Hydroxychloroquine to Treat COVID-19 Despite Efficacy Concerns, ABC NEWS, (July 28, 2020,
7:06 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-doubles-defense-hydroxychloroquine-treat-

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol56/iss1/7

22

Perryman: Agents of Bioshield

2021] Agents of Bioshield: The FDA, EUAs, and Public Trust

363

2. Remdesivir. On May 1, 2020, the FDA issued an EUA for
remdesivir (also known as Veklury) for the treatment of
hospitalized adult and pediatric patients with severe COVID-19.113
The FDA issued this EUA following preliminary results from a
randomized, double-blinded, placebo-controlled trial conducted by
the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease (NIAID)
and an open-label trial by the pharmaceutical company Gilead,
which indicated that remdesivir shortened hospital stays by 31% in
some patient populations.114 Remdesivir had IND status but was
not previously approved by the FDA for any indication.115 On the
day of the EUA issuance, the FDA did not release the data
underlying the relevant efficacy statistics referred to in its
authorization letter.116 A variety of doctors in the United States
called for the FDA to release the data so that they could treat the
right patients properly.117 A preliminary version of the peer-

covid-19-efficacy/story?id=72039824 (quoting several statements President Trump made in
support of hydroxychloroquine).
113 Letter from Denise M. Hinton, Chief Scientist, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Ashley
Rhoades, Regulatory Affairs Manager, Gilead Sciences, Inc. 1 (Oct. 22, 2020) [hereinafter
Remdesivir EUA], https://www.fda.gov/media/137564/download.
114 See Deena Beasley, U.S. Doctors Call for Remdesivir Data to Guide Coronavirus
Treatment, REUTERS (May 21, 2020, 5:16 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-healthcoronavirus-gilead-sciences/u-s-doctors-call-for-remdesivir-data-to-guide-coronavirustreatment-idUSKBN22X2Q3 (“The FDA approved emergency use of remdesivir on May 1
based on preliminary results from a National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
(NIAID) trial showing that the drug cut hospital stays by 31%, or about four days, compared
with a placebo.”).
115 See Remdesivir EUA, supra note 113, at 1 (granting an emergency use authorization for
remdesivir and noting that remdesivir “was an investigational drug and not approved for any
indication”).
116 See Beasley, supra note 114 (noting that the FDA did not release the data it referred to
in the EUA); NIH Clinical Trial Shows Remdesivir Accelerates Recovery from Advanced
COVID-19, NIH (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.niaid.nih.gov/news-events/nih-clinical-trialshows-remdesivir-accelerates-recovery-advanced-covid-19 (“More detailed information about
the trial results, including more comprehensive data, will be available in a forthcoming
report.”).
117 See Beasley, supra note 114 (“U.S. doctors and others in the scientific community are
calling for the release of data that convinced health regulators to authorize emergency use of
. . . remdesivir to treat COVID-19 . . . .”).
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reviewed findings was published three weeks later, and a final
version was published six months later.118
In August of 2020, the FDA expanded the EUA to include
treatment of all hospitalized adult and pediatric patients with
COVID-19 after the results of two clinical trials indicated that the
drug improved recovery times for all patients, including those with
mild to moderate disease.119 Two months later, the FDA approved
remdesivir for a large patient population based on the results of
“three randomized, controlled clinical trials,” but the EUA
continued for those populations not covered by the approval.120
3. Convalescent Plasma. On August 23, 2020, the FDA issued an
EUA for COVID-19 convalescent plasma.121 COVID-19 convalescent
plasma had IND status and was not previously licensed or approved
for any indication.122 The EUA letter cited data demonstrating
clinical benefits but noted that the data was not obtained from well-

118 John H. Beigel et al., Remdesivir for the Treatment of COVID-19, 383 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1813, 1813 (2020) (noting that “[a] preliminary version of this article was published on May
22, 2020” and that the “data show that remdesivir was superior to placebo in shortening the
time to recovery in adults who were hospitalized with Covid-19 and had evidence of lower
respiratory tract infection”).
119 See Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., COVID-19 Update: FDA Broadens
Emergency Use Authorization for Veklury (Remdesivir) to Include All Hospitalized Patients
for Treatment of COVID-19 (Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/pressannouncements/covid-19-update-fda-broadens-emergency-use-authorization-vekluryremdesivir-include-all-hospitalized (“The expansion of the scope of the EUA to include
hospitalized patients with mild or moderate COVID-19 is supported by the Agency’s analysis
of additional data from two randomized, controlled clinical trials that included patients with
mild or moderate disease.”).
120 Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves First Treatment for COVID19 (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-approvesfirst-treatment-covid-19. Remdesivir was approved for adults and pediatric patients at least
twelve years of age and weighing at least forty kilograms. Id.
121 Letter from Denise M. Hinton, Chief Scientist, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Robert P.
Kadlec, Assistant Sec’y for Preparedness and Response, U.S. Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs.
(Aug.
23,
2020)
[hereinafter
Convalescent
Plasma
EUA],
https://web.archive.org/web/20200922235943/https://www.fda.gov/media/141477/download.
Convalescent plasma “is the acellular component of blood that contains antibodies,” which is
collected from patients who have recovered from COVID-19. Sean T. H. Liu, et al.,
Convalescent Plasma Treatment of Severe COVID-19: A Propensity Score-Matched Control
Study, 26 NATURE MED. 1708, 1708 (2020). The plasma is then transfused into patients
currently infected with SARS-CoV-2. Id.
122 Convalescent Plasma EUA, supra note 121.
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controlled randomized clinical trials.123 Rather, the data was
derived from a nationwide expanded access program (also known as
“compassionate use”)124 run by the Mayo Clinic, which treated more
than 70,000 people.125 The FDA initially intended to conduct wellcontrolled, randomized trials of convalescent plasma, but as the
expanded access program grew, the trials struggled to enroll
patients.126 Following publicized reports of disagreement between
FDA scientists and the Trump Administration about whether to
issue the authorization127 and controversial statements made at the
press conference announcing the authorization,128 fears of political
influence on the EUA issuance emerged.129 The COVID-19
Treatment Panel at the NIH issued a statement explaining that
there was not enough evidence for the panel to recommend the use
of convalescent plasma for treatment of COVID-19 but recognizing
that the FDA could argue that the data met the “may be effective”

123 See id. (“Given that the clinical evidence supporting this EUA was not obtained from
prospective, well-controlled randomized clinical trials (RCTs), additional RCTs are needed.”).
124 See James T. O’Reilly & Katharine A. Van Tassel, 1 FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. § 13:90,
Westlaw (database updated June 2021) (“The FDA allows for individual access to
investigational therapies for terminally ill patients outside of a clinical trial under expanded
or ‘compassionate’ use on a case-by-case basis pursuant to The Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA).”).
125 See Rachel Sachs, Understanding the FDA’s Controversial Convalescent Plasma
AFFS.:
BLOG
(Aug.
27,
2020),
Authorization,
HEALTH
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200827.190308/full/ (“[T]he FDA has faced
serious questions about the expanded access program, which has now grown to treat more
than 70,000 patients while the randomized clinical trials struggle to enroll enough patients
to determine whether plasma is truly effective against COVID-19.”).
126 See id. (explaining how the FDA had to put plans “on hold” after the issuance of the
EUA because of various challenges, including low enrollment).
127 See id. (“The manner in which the EUA was granted raised a series of questions about
the agency’s independence from political pressure.”).
128 See, e.g., Kai Kupferschmidt & Jon Cohen, In Plasma OK, Critics See Politics, Not
Science, 369 SCI. 1038, 1038–39 (2020) (describing fears over political interference in the
issuance of EUAs for convalescent plasma based on the press conference announcement,
which “represented as much political theater as science”).
129 See Noah Wieland, Sharon LaFraniere & Sheri Fink, F.D.A.’s Emergency Approval of
TIMES
(Jan.
6,
2021),
Blood
Plasma
Is
Now
on
Hold,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/19/us/politics/blood-plasma-covid-19.html (“[A] group of
top federal health officials including Dr. Francis S. Collins and Dr. Anthony S. Fauci
intervened [in the issuance of the EUA for convalescent plasma], arguing that emerging data
on the treatment was too weak, according to two senior administration officials.”).
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criteria for EUA issuance.130 On February 4, 2021, the FDA revised
the EUA to authorize “only the use of high titer COVID-19
convalescent plasma, for the treatment of hospitalized patients with
COVID-19, early in the disease course” after “additional studies,
including randomized, controlled trials . . . provided data to further
inform the safety and efficacy of COVID-19 convalescent plasma.”131
4. Vaccines. As of this writing, the FDA has issued EUAs for
three COVID-19 vaccines.132 Rampant speculation and concern
about the possibility of a vaccine EUA marked the months preceding
the vaccine EUAs.133 Comments from various politicians, the

130
Convalescent
Plasma,
NIH,
https://web.archive.org/web/20201011025339/https://www.covid19treatmentguidelines.nih.g
ov/immune-based-therapy/blood-derived-products/convalescent-plasma/ (last updated Oct. 9,
2021) (“There are insufficient data for the COVID-19 Treatment Guidelines Panel (the Panel)
to recommend either for or against the use of COVID-19 convalescent plasma for the
treatment of COVID-19.”).
131 Letter from Denise M. Hinton, Chief Scientist, U.S. Food & Drug Admin, to Nikki
Bratcher-Bowman, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Preparedness and Response, U.S. Dep’t Health
&
Hum.
Servs.
(Feb.
4,
2021),
https://web.archive.org/web/20210216050215/https://www.fda.gov/media/141477/download.
“Titer”
refers
to
the
concentration
of
antibodies.
Titer,
MEDLINEPLUS,
https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/002328.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2021).
132
Emergency
Use
Authorization,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/mcm-legal-regulatory-andpolicy-framework/emergency-use-authorization (last updated Nov. 9, 2021) (listing the EUAs
for the Janssen, Moderna, and Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccines). The FDA also issued
revised EUAs authorizing booster shots for each of the vaccines. Press Release, U.S. Food &
Drug Admin., Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: FDA Takes Additional Actions on the Use of
a Booster Dose for COVID-19 Vaccines (Oct. 20, 2021) [hereinafter Vaccine Booster Press
Release],
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19update-fda-takes-additional-actions-use-booster-dose-covid-19-vaccines.
133 See, e.g., Philip Rucker, Josh Dawsey & Yasmeen Abutaleb, Trump Fixates on the
Promise of a Vaccine — Real or Not — as Key to Reelection Bid, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2020,
5:02
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-vaccineelection/2020/09/05/c0da86d6-edf5-11ea-99a1-71343d03bc29_story.html (“There is intense
disagreement over whether the FDA should use its emergency authority to clear a vaccine
before it is formally approved, which some in the scientific community say could be
dangerous.”); Jon Cohen, “There’s Only One Chance to Do This Right”—FDA Panel Wrestles
with
COVID-19
Vaccine
Issues,
SCI.
(Oct.
23,
2020,
3:45
PM),
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/10/there-s-only-one-chance-do-right-fda-panelwrestles-covid-19-vaccine-issues (discussing disagreement among the Vaccine and Related
Biological Products Advisory Committee (VRBPAC) members about whether the FDA should
issue vaccine EUAs).
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impending 2020 presidential election,134 and widely publicized
controversies surrounding other EUAs all increased public concern
about the safety of a possible vaccine EUA—in addition to concerns
about political motivations influencing the authorization process.135
In response to mounting public pressure, in early September
2020, the chief executives of nine pharmaceutical companies
pledged that the companies would “only submit for approval or
emergency use authorization after demonstrating safety and
efficacy through a Phase 3 clinical study that is designed and
conducted to meet requirements of expert regulatory authorities
such as FDA.”136 Then, in October 2020, the FDA released more
stringent guidelines for EUAs of vaccines.137 Although these
guidelines were nonbinding,138 they made it unlikely that a vaccine
would be authorized prior to Election Day—November 3, 2020—

134 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 133 (“President Donald Trump repeatedly pushed for a
COVID-19 vaccine EUA before the 3 November elections . . . .”).
135 See, e.g., id. (“Several VRBPAC members worried an EUA could contribute to the
public’s growing hesitancy toward COVID-19 vaccines by fueling the perception that FDA
was compromising its famously high standards.”); Rucker et al., supra note 133 (describing
the pressure that President Trump placed on health officials to approve a coronavirus
vaccine); Zettler et al., supra note 4, at 165–66 (noting that “although FDA has not yet faced
the question of whether to issue an EUA for a COVID-19 vaccine, concerns about political
interference in such a decision have been raised, particularly if an EUA application is under
review shortly before the November 2020 election,” and “developing rigorous evidence of
safety and effectiveness . . . will be particularly critical before distributing a COVID-19
vaccine”).
136 See Press Release, Pfizer, Inc., Biopharma Leaders Unite to Stand with Science (Sept.
8, 2020), https://www.pfizer.com/news/press-release/press-release-detail/biopharma-leadersunite-stand-science (stating that the CEOs “want[ed] to make clear [their] on-going
commitment to developing and testing potential vaccines for COVID-19 in accordance with
high ethical standards and sound scientific principles”).
137 See CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RSCH., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATION FOR VACCINES TO PREVENT COVID-19 (2020) [hereinafter
VACCINE
GUIDANCE],
2020
https://web.archive.org/web/20201223081724/https://www.fda.gov/media/142749/download
("[F]or a COVID-19 vaccine for which there is adequate manufacturing information to ensure
its quality and consistency, issuance of an EUA would require a determination by FDA that
the vaccine’s benefits outweigh its risks based on data from at least one well-designed Phase
3 clinical trial that demonstrates the vaccine’s safety and efficacy in a clear and compelling
manner.”).
138 Id. (noting that the document contains “nonbinding recommendations”).
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contrary to the pressure from the President.139 Among other
requirements, the new guidelines required that data from Phase 3
studies “include a median follow-up duration of at least two months
after” the completion of the vaccination regimen.140 Vaccine
developers were also required to collect data in “ongoing trials for
as long as feasible” after EUA issuance and to work towards
receiving full FDA approval.141 The new guidelines strongly
recommended that vaccine developers monitor “a high proportion”
of enrolled subjects,” “numbering well over 3,000,” for serious
adverse events and “adverse events of special interest for at least
one month after” completing the vaccine regimen.142
The FDA eventually issued EUAs for three vaccines: the PfizerBioNTech vaccine (the Pfizer vaccine) and the Moderna TX, Inc.
vaccine (the Moderna vaccine) in December of 2020143 and the
Janssen Biotech, Inc. vaccine (the Johnson & Johnson vaccine) in
February of 2021.144 In its press releases describing the December
EUAs, the FDA assured high levels of scientific rigor and
independent decision-making during the EUA process.145 All EUAs
See Zachary Brennan, White House Lifts Block on FDA’s Stricter Vaccine Requirements,
POLITICO (Oct. 6, 2020, 9:21 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/10/06/fda-vaccineguidelines-white-house-426764 (describing the impact of the FDA’s EUA vaccine guidance
and President Trump’s reaction).
140 2020 VACCINE GUIDANCE, supra note 137, at 10.
141 Id. at 4.
142 Id. at 10.
143 Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Takes Key Action in Fight Against
COVID-19 By Issuing Emergency Use Authorization for First COVID-19 Vaccine (Dec. 11,
2020) [hereinafter Pfizer Press Release], https://www.fda.gov/news-events/pressannouncements/fda-takes-key-action-fight-against-covid-19-issuing-emergency-useauthorization-first-covid-19; Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Takes Additional
Action in Fight Against COVID-19 By Issuing Emergency Use Authorization for Second
COVID-19 Vaccine (Dec. 18, 2020) [hereinafter Moderna Press Release],
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-takes-additional-action-fightagainst-covid-19-issuing-emergency-use-authorization-second-covid.
144 Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Issues Emergency Use Authorization for
Third COVID-19 Vaccine (Feb. 27, 2021) [hereinafter J&J Press Release],
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-issues-emergency-useauthorization-third-covid-19-vaccine.
145 See Pfizer Press Release, supra note 143 (“Today’s action follows an open and
transparent review process that included input from independent scientific and public health
experts and a thorough evaluation by the agency’s career scientists to ensure this vaccine met
FDA’s rigorous, scientific standards for safety, effectiveness, and manufacturing quality
139
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were based on data derived from ongoing randomized, placebocontrolled studies with over 30,000 participants.146 Participants in
the Moderna study were followed for a median of seven weeks with
additional safety data reviewed after nine weeks,147 while Pfizer and
Janssen study participants were followed for medians of two months
and eight weeks respectively.148 At the time of approval, the
preliminary data indicated that the Moderna “vaccine was 94.1%
effective . . . in preventing COVID-19 at least 14 days after the
second dose,”149 and the Pfizer vaccine was 95% effective in
preventing COVID-19.150 The preliminary data from the Janssen
study indicated that the vaccine was 66.9% effective at least
fourteen days after vaccination151 and 66.1% effective at least
twenty-eight days after vaccination.152
The FDA issued the EUAs with various conditions, including
that vaccine manufacturers report all vaccine administration
errors, any serious adverse events, any cases of Multisystem
Inflammatory Syndrome in adults, and any cases of COVID-19 that
needed to support emergency use authorization.”); Moderna Press Release, supra note 143
(“Today’s authorization demonstrates our steadfast commitment to the health of the
American people, with the assurance that our scientific standards and the integrity of our
review process have been maintained. This achievement is yet another testament to the
dedication of FDA’s career scientists and physicians, who have been working urgently to
conduct comprehensive and rigorous evaluations of the data submitted for vaccines to prevent
COVID-19.”).
146 Pfizer Press Release, supra note 143 (stating the trial included 37,586 participants);
Moderna Press Release, supra note 143 (stating the trial included 30,351 participants); J&J
Press Release, supra note 144 (stating the trial involved 43,783 participants).
147 Letter from Denise M. Hinton, Chief Scientist, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Carlota
Vinals, ModernaTX, Inc. 1–2 (Dec. 18, 2020) [hereinafter Moderna EUA],
https://web.archive.org/web/20201231160643/https://www.fda.gov/media/144636/download.
148 Letter from Denise M. Hinton, Chief Scientist, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Elisa
Harkins,
Pfizer,
Inc.
2
(Dec.
23,
2020)
[hereinafter
Pfizer
EUA],
https://web.archive.org/web/20210102082132/https://www.fda.gov/media/144412/download;
Letter from Denise M. Hinton, Chief Scientist, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Ruta
Walawalkar, Janssen Biotech, Inc. 1–2 (Feb. 27, 2021) [hereinafter J&J EUA],
https://web.archive.org/web/20210411075651/https://www.fda.gov/media/146303/download.
149 95% Confidence Interval: 89.3, 96.8. Moderna EUA, supra note 147, at 2. The
preliminary results indicated that the vaccine was 94.5% effective seven weeks after the
second dose (95% Confidence Interval: 86.5, 97.8). Id.
150 95% Credible Interval: 90.3, 97.6. Pfizer EUA, supra note 148, at 2.
151 95% Confidence Interval: 59.0, 73.4. J&J EUA, supra note 148, at 2.
152 95% Confidence Interval: 55.0, 74.8. Id.
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result in hospitalization or death that are reported to the company
to the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS).153 The
EUA also required the companies to submit monthly safety reports
and
conduct
post-authorization
observational
studies.154
Additionally, the FDA required Moderna to continue its ongoing
clinical studies155 and Moderna, Pfizer, and Janssen to conduct postauthorization observational studies to evaluate the association
between the vaccines and “a pre-specified list of adverse events of
special interest, along with deaths and hospitalizations, and severe
COVID-19.”156
In April of 2021, the FDA ordered a pause of the Janssen
vaccine—but did not revoke the EUA—in response to six cases of
blood clots, including one death, reported to VAERS.157 In late April,
the EUA vaccine fact sheets were revised to reflect the risk of blood
clots, but the FDA determined that Janssen vaccinations should
resume because the data indicated that blood clots were extremely
rare.158 Even after lifting the pause, public distrust regarding the
safety of the vaccine EUAs, especially the Janssen vaccine,
continued.159 Despite this, the vaccine EUAs achieved significant
success. For example, in May of 2021, the FDA expanded the Pfizer
vaccine EUA, which had previously applied only to individuals

Pfizer EUA, supra note 148, at 6; Moderna EUA, supra note 147, at 6; J&J EUA, supra
note 148, at 6.
154 Moderna EUA, supra note 147, at 7–8; Pfizer EUA, supra note 148, at 7–8; J&J EUA
supra note 148, at 6–7.
155 Moderna EUA, supra note 147, at 7.
156 Id. at 7; Pfizer EUA, supra note 148, at 7; J&J EUA supra note 148, at 7.
157 See Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA and CDC Lift Recommended Pause
on Johnson & Johnson (Janssen) COVID-19 Vaccine Use Following Thorough Safety Review
(Apr. 23, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-and-cdc-liftrecommended-pause-johnson-johnson-janssen-covid-19-vaccine-use-following-thorough
(describing the rationale behind the recommended pause and resumption of vaccinations).
158 Id. (encouraging healthcare providers, as well as recipients and caregivers, to review
relevant changes to the new Janssen vaccine fact sheets, reflecting the latest information and
guidance).
159 See, e.g., Mia Sato, The J&J Vaccine Is Back. Next Comes Trust, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr.
29, 2021), https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/04/29/1024205/jj-johnson-and-johnsonvaccine-trust/ (“[E]ven though the pause lasted just 11 days, it raised new concerns about
whether Americans will trust vaccinations. Recent polling shows that confidence in the
Johnson & Johnson shot in particular is very low, with 73% of unvaccinated people saying
they wouldn’t accept a dose if offered.”).
153
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sixteen years and older, to include those twelve years and older.160
Then, in August of 2021, the FDA granted the Pfizer vaccine full
approval for individuals sixteen years and older, while the EUA
continued to cover children ages twelve through sixteen.161 In late
October of 2021, the FDA re-issued the Pfizer EUA for children ages
five through eleven.162 Despite these successes, the Biden
Administration was unable to meet its initial vaccination goals by
July of 2021.163 Nevertheless, in the following months, vaccine rates
continued to increase.164 By October of 2021, the FDA expanded the
160 Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: FDA
Authorizes Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 Vaccine for Emergency Use in Adolescents in Another
Important Action in Fight Against Pandemic (May 10, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19-update-fda-authorizes-pfizer-biontechcovid-19-vaccine-emergency-use.
161 See Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves First COVID-19 Vaccine
(Aug. 21, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-approves-firstcovid-19-vaccine (“The FDA’s approval of this vaccine is a milestone as we continue to battle
the COVID-19 pandemic. While this and other vaccines have met the FDA’s rigorous,
scientific standards for emergency use authorization, as the first FDA-approved COVID-19
vaccine, the public can be very confident that this vaccine meets the high standards for safety,
effectiveness, and manufacturing quality the FDA requires of an approved product.”).
162 Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Authorizes Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19
Vaccine for Emergency Use in Children 5 through 11 Years of Age (Oct. 29, 2021),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-authorizes-pfizer-biontechcovid-19-vaccine-emergency-use-children-5-through-11-years-age; Letter from Jacqueline A.
O’Shaughnessy, Acting Chief Scientist, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Amit Patel, Pfizer, Inc.
3 (Oct. 29, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/media/150386/download. The EUA was granted based
on data from “an ongoing randomized, placebo-controlled study that has enrolled
approximately 4,700 children 5 through 11 years of age.” Press Release, supra. “The vaccine
was found to be 90.7% effective in preventing COVID-19 in children 5 through 11” and “no
serious side effects” were detected in a study that involved “approximately 3,100 children age
5 through 11.” Id.
163 See Richard Luscombe, US Reaches Biden’s 70% First-Shot Goal as Threat to
(Aug.
2,
2021,
8:41
PM),
Unvaccinated
People
Grows,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/aug/02/us-vaccination-rate-covid-coronavirusbiden-white-house (“The president had said he wanted the country to reach 70% at least
partially vaccinated by the early July holiday, but the White House coronavirus response
coordinator . . . admitted in June that the country would need ‘a few extra weeks’ because of
reluctance by those aged 18 to 26 to get a shot.”).
164 See, e.g., Jeff Mason & Ahmed Aboulenein, U.S. COVID-19 Vaccine Rates up Thanks to
Mandates; Cases and Deaths Down – Officials, REUTERS (Oct. 13, 2021, 10:48 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/world/us/vaccine-requirements-raised-covid-19-vaccination-ratesby-20-percentage-points-2021-10-13/ (discussing the rising vaccination rates and attributing
the increase to vaccine mandates).
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three vaccine EUAs to include booster doses for specific patient
populations.165 As of this writing, however, vaccine hesitancy
continues to pose a challenge to public health authorities seeking to
increase vaccination rates.166
While not an exhaustive summary, this Part has described
various important EUAs that demonstrate how the procedure works
in practice.167 These EUAs represent the benefits of the EUA

See Vaccine Booster Press Release, supra note 132.
See, e.g., Alison Durkee, Here’s How Covid-19 Vaccine Hesitancy Has (and Hasn’t)
(Dec.
26,
2021,
2:56
PM),
Changed
over
2021,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/alisondurkee/2021/12/26/heres-how-covid-19-vaccinehesitancy-has-and-hasnt-changed-over-2021/ (“More than 25% of U.S. adults are still not
fully vaccinated against Covid-19 as 2021 comes to an end . . . .”); Covid News: Omicron Hasn’t
Swayed the Least Vaccinated U.S. Counties, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2021, 5:11 AM),
https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/12/27/world/cdc-quarantine-isolation-guidelines (“In the
United States, over 204 million people are fully vaccinated, but that’s still only 62 percent of
the population, much lower than in most other wealthy countries.”).
167 This Note summarizes EUAs that impacted the largest population groups for each PHE
discussed. For more details about every drug and biological therapeutic product issued, see
Emergency Use Authorization, supra note 132. At the time of this writing, the FDA authorized
two pills, molnupiravir and Paxlovid, for treatment of mild-to-moderate COVID-19 in adults.
Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: FDA Authorizes
Additional Oral Antiviral for Treatment of COVID-19 in Certain Adults (Dec. 23, 2021),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19-update-fdaauthorizes-additional-oral-antiviral-treatment-covid-19-certain; Press Release, U.S. Food &
Drug Admin., Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: FDA Authorizes First Oral Antiviral for
Treatment of COVID-19 (Dec. 22, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/pressannouncements/coronavirus-covid-19-update-fda-authorizes-first-oral-antiviral-treatmentcovid-19. Examining the issuances and progression of these EUAs in the following months
may provide important insight into the importance of rapid authorization once sufficient data
is gathered and the benefits and pitfalls of utilizing advisory committees is ascertained. See,
e.g., Celine Castronuovo & Jeannie Baumann, Pfizer Covid Pill’s Fast Signoff Spurs Row Over
Skipped
Step
(1),
BLOOMBERG
L.
(Dec.
22,
2021,
4:29
PM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/pfizer-covid-pill-clearance-sparkscalls-for-more-transparency (“The FDA authorized Pfizer Inc.’s pill to treat Covid-19 without
first getting input from a panel of clinical advisers, a move public health professionals say
could further undermine trust in an agency already facing scrutiny over its rapid decisionmaking during the pandemic.”); David Lim & Lauren Gardner, FDA Weighs Molnupiravir
After Narrow Advisory Committee Vote, POLITICO (Dec. 3, 2021, 12:00 PM),
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/prescription-pulse/2021/12/03/fda-weighsmolnupiravir-after-narrow-advisory-committee-vote-799245
(“[T]he
13–10
[advisory
committee] vote was a squeaker, signaling the drug is not the panacea many would like to
see on the market.”).
165
166
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procedure and illustrate possibilities for reform, further discussed
in Part IV.

IV. ANALYSIS AND POSSIBILITIES FOR REFORM
Any emergency situation in which the government grants a few
people the power to make quick, executive decisions will likely elicit
criticisms of the decision-making, concerns about independence and
objectivity, high levels of public scrutiny, and post-hoc analysis.168
The EUA procedure is no exception. The FDA Commissioner’s
status as a presidential appointee has led critics to speculate
whether political incentives, rather than health-oriented public
policy, have influenced the EUA decision-making process.169
Although scientific data is in one sense objective, reasonable minds
can differ on issues such as the reliability of study protocol and
sample size, the interpretation of data, and the outcome of the costbenefit analysis throughout the various stages of the EUA
process.170 During the COVID-19 pandemic, many people—in both
the public and private sectors, and within and outside of the
scientific community—have closely scrutinized the data that the

See, e.g., supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text.
For instance, critics speculated about FDA Commissioner Stephen Hahn’s ability to
protect the FDA from President Trump’s influence during the coronavirus pandemic. See
Sheila Kaplan, Stephen Hahn, F.D.A. Chief, Is Caught Between Scientists and the President,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/10/health/stephen-hahnfda.html (“Many medical experts—including members of his own staff—worry about whether
Dr. Hahn, despite his good intentions, has the fortitude and political savvy to protect the
scientific integrity of the F.D.A. from the president.”). The President has the power to remove
the FDA Commissioner. See, e.g., PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL & LEWIS A.
GROSSMAN, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 17 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 4th
ed. 2013) (“A Commissioner of Food and Drugs is subject to direction and may be
removed . . . for any or no reason.”). Some have argued in favor of making the FDA an
independent agency, a topic beyond the scope of this Note. E.g., Robert M. Califf, Margaret
Hamburg, Jane E. Henney, David A. Kessler, Mark McClellan, Andrew C. von Eschenbach
& Frank Young, Seven Former FDA Commissioners: The FDA Should Be an Independent
Federal Agency, 38 HEALTH AFFS. 84, 84 (2019) (“Seven former commissioners of the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) from both sides of the political aisle recommend that the
FDA be moved out of the Department of Health and Human Services and reconfigured as an
independent federal agency.”).
170 See, e.g., Peter Kosso, Science and Objectivity, 86 J. PHIL. 245, 245–47 (1989) (discussing
various characterizations of objectivity in science); supra Part III.
168
169
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FDA relied upon when issuing EUAs for drugs and vaccines.171 This
public monitoring can hold the FDA accountable during a CBRN
emergency, but it can also contribute to confusion and distrust
surrounding EUAs.172 Furthermore, the media and public have
consistently demonstrated confusion about differences between
EUA and traditional routes to market, fueling false or confusing
narratives about the safety of EUA products.173 All of these factors
combine to further heighten public scrutiny and concern
surrounding EUAs during an emergency. Overall, the criticisms of
the EUA procedure fall into two broad, overlapping categories: (1)
concern with scientific rigor and (2) concern with the independence
of the FDA’s decision-making.
Critical examination of past EUAs, especially the “stress test”
that the COVID-19 pandemic posed, demonstrates the benefits of
the EUA procedure more clearly. Ultimately, Congress took an
important and effective step in improving the United States’ PHE
response procedure when it first established the EUA process
through the Project BioShield Act of 2004.174 The EUA process
enables the FDA to quickly respond to a PHE and to provide the
public with promising tests, medical devices, drugs, and biologics to
help track and treat diseases.175
Despite continued controversy surrounding EUAs, the FDA has
achieved significant success with the EUA procedure.176 For
example, the EUAs issued for two drugs during the H1N1 outbreak
appeared to help reduce the number of deaths and the duration of
the disease, and earlier authorization of a vaccine could have
further reduced cases.177 During the early stages of the COVID-19
See supra Section III.C.4.
See, e.g., supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text.
173 See Zettler et al., supra note 4, at 165 (“[S]ome media reports continue to equate EUAs
with FDA approval, including by reporting that FDA ‘approved’ the drugs for which it issued
EUAs. It is critical that policymakers, health care professionals, and the public understand
that . . . products issued EUAs are not necessarily safe or effective countermeasures for
COVID-19.”).
174 See supra note 39.
175 See supra notes 13–17 and accompanying text.
176 For examples of EUA controversies, see supra notes 109–112, 117–118, 126–130 and
accompanying text. For examples of EUA successes, see supra notes 86–89, 119–120, 143–
152 and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 90–92, 96 and accompanying text.
171
172
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pandemic, the FDA issued an EUA for remdesivir based on
preliminary results from a randomized, double-blinded, placebocontrolled trial conducted by NIAID and an open-label trial by a
pharmaceutical company.178 Five months later, the FDA approved
the drug for treatment of a specific population, and the drug has
been used throughout the pandemic to treat people afflicted with
COVID-19.179 The FDA also issued EUAs for three COVID-19
vaccines based on preliminary results from Phase 3 clinical trials.180
While the ultimate effects of these EUAs on the continued spread of
the virus cannot be calculated currently, the EUA procedure
granted the FDA the flexibility necessary to approve these muchneeded vaccines at a faster rate than ever before.181 Ultimately, the
EUA procedure allows the FDA to respond quickly to a crisis in a
way that it otherwise could not, and unduly hampering the EUA
process could cost lives.182
It is important to note that any EUA revocation will likely result
in heightened criticism and scrutiny of the process.183 A revocation,
however, does not automatically indicate that the process has
failed.184 Rather, a revocation indicates that the review procedures
and flexibility provided by the EUA process function as they
should.185 An EUA does not function as an expedited process for
NDA or BLA approval, but rather as a measure employed only
during times of emergency when the cost-benefit analysis of issuing

See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
180 See supra notes 143–152 and accompanying text.
181 See supra Section III.C.4; notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
182 See supra notes 57–64 and accompanying text.
183 For example, the revocation of the hydroxychloroquine EUA spurred many journalists
to re-examine the original EUA letter. See Thomson & Nachlis, supra note 105, at 1282–83
(examining the issuance and revocation of the hydroxychloroquine EUA, a “politically and
scientifically contentious [process that] illustrates central problems that can arise with
emergency drug authorizations during crises”).
184 While the Janssen EUA was not revoked, if the FDA had determined that the blood clots
significantly altered the risk-benefit analysis, it could quickly and efficiently revoke the EUA
to adapt to this knew knowledge and risk-benefit assessment. See supra note 53 and
accompanying text.
185 See Zettler et al., supra note 4, at 165 (“A revocation reflects the uncertainty
surrounding safety and effectiveness of countermeasures that receive an EUA, along with the
iterative nature of EUA issuance and oversight.”).
178
179
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an authorization differs markedly from non-emergency
situations.186
The EUA procedure is not perfect, though. The EUA procedure
grants the FDA Commissioner a vast amount of discretion and
presents a low evidentiary burden.187 While this discretion and low
evidentiary burden empower the FDA to act quickly, the FDA
Commissioner could misuse this discretion. The chloroquine and
hydroxychloroquine EUA and the convalescent plasma EUA, for
example, demonstrate some of the failures of the EUA process.188
The FDA relied upon limited, and in some cases flawed, evidence
when it issued the chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine EUA during
the COVID-19 pandemic.189 The FDA did not specifically cite which
evidence it relied upon in its original authorization letter, creating
additional public skepticism about the EUA.190 Prior to the EUA
issuance, President Trump made statements in support of
authorization that contributed to public confusion about the drug’s
effectiveness.191 The publicized revocation of the EUA undermined
public trust in the independence of the FDA and in the safety of
EUAs at an early stage in the pandemic when garnering public trust
was critical.192 The chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine EUA thus
illustrated three potential flaws in the EUA procedure: (1) the very
low evidentiary standard was fully utilized; (2) the FDA was not
sufficiently transparent in its authorization letter; and (3) the lack
of any clear evidentiary standard contributed to concerns that
politics could have influenced the FDA’s decision-making.193

186 See Zettler et al., supra note 4, at 163–65 (contrasting traditional FDA approval and
emergency use authorization).
187 The Commissioner must find that “is reasonable to believe” that the authorized product
“may be effective.” See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
188 See supra Sections III.C.1, 3.
189 See supra notes 103–110 and accompanying text.
190 See supra notes 102–103 and accompanying text. The FDA also did not release details
about the NIAID trial that it relied upon when issuing the remdesivir EUA, leading to
confusion and concern by prescribing doctors. See supra notes 115–117 and accompanying
text.
191 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
192 See supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text.
193 See supra notes 103–112 and accompanying text.
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EUAs can also hamper researchers’ ability to recruit and conduct
adequately controlled randomized trials.194 This issue first arose in
regard to the EUAs issued during the H1N1 pandemic, and
researchers remain unable to conduct adequately controlled studies
to determine the effectiveness of one of the drugs that was
authorized to treat H1N1.195 The convalescent plasma EUA raised
similar concerns because it reduced access to participants for
controlled clinical trials.196 Granting an EUA may diminish
scientists’ ability to continue conducting research on the efficacy of
the authorized product simply because fewer people will be willing
to participate in randomized, controlled clinical trials.197 In
randomized, controlled clinical trials, participants risk falling into
the control population where they receive a placebo instead of the
drug or vaccine being tested.198 By contrast, participants enjoy
guaranteed access to the treatment through the compassionate use
pathway or by obtaining a prescription under an EUA.199 Adequate
clinical trials are essential to properly evaluate the EUA and
confirm that the EUA’s preliminary risk-benefit analysis holds true,
but requiring completion of clinical trials before EUA issuance could
cause the FDA to deny people in need access to effective
treatment.200
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Jong et al., supra note 92, at 172, 181 (stating that “a significant clinical benefit
was not demonstrated for peramivir,” one of the H1N1 antivirals granted EUA, and noting
that “[t]he study was terminated for futility after a planned interim analysis”).
196 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
197 See Sachs, supra note 125 (stating that “the grant of the EUA itself may make it more
difficult for the FDA to obtain results from the randomized controlled trials it has stated will
be needed to determine the product’s efficacy” because patients are more likely to pick a
guarantee of treatment instead of the chance of receiving a placebo).
198 Id.
199 See id. (“[F]or patients and their doctors, the choice is clear: why enroll in clinical trials
in which you might be assigned to the placebo group, when you could be assured of receiving
the treatment under the EUA?”); Helen Branswell, FDA Shows Signs of Cold Feet over
Emergency
Authorization
of
Covid-19
Vaccines,
STAT
(Oct.
23,
2020),
https://www.statnews.com/2020/10/23/fda-shows-signs-of-cold-feet-over-emergencyauthorization-of-covid-19-vaccines/ (“[T]he fear is that early authorization of vaccines could
squander a one-time chance to determine how well the various vaccines work and which work
best in whom.”).
200 Zettler et al., supra note 4, at 165 (“Pre-approval access, including via EUAs, has the
potential to interfere with . . . necessary generation [of evidence of products’ safety and
effectiveness] by making it difficult to enroll participants in clinical trials.”).
194
195
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Last, vaccines raise special concerns surrounding public trust
and compliance with public health interventions.201 The prospect of
an expedited process for vaccine development and authorization
consistently raises fears about the safety and efficacy of authorized
vaccines.202 The possibility of the FDA granting an EUA for a
vaccine elicited public concern and criticism during the
government’s anthrax response,203 the H1N1 pandemic,204 and the
COVID-19 pandemic.205 EUAs raise fears about the scientific rigor
of the vaccine’s testing and the safety of the ultimate product.206 An
ineffective or dangerous vaccine could unnecessarily endanger
healthy people and further undermine public trust in vaccines.207
Even if a vaccine is safe and effective, herd immunity requires
widespread vaccine compliance in combination with natural
immunity resulting from infection.208 Distrust of a vaccine can
render even the most effective vaccine a failure.209

See Efthimios Parasidis, Public Health Law and Institutional Vaccine Skepticism, 41 J.
HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 1137, 1140 (2016) (“A common thread underlying vaccine hesitancy
is a lack of trust in government and industry.”).
202 See, e.g., supra notes 97, 135, 166.
203 See supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text.
204 See supra notes 94, 96 and accompanying text.
205 See, e.g., Alec Tyson, Courtney Johnson & Cary Funk, U.S. Public Now Divided over
Whether to Get COVID-19 Vaccine, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 17, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2020/09/17/u-s-public-now-divided-over-whether-toget-covid-19-vaccine/ (“[T]he . . . survey finds three-quarters of Americans (77%) think it’s
very or somewhat likely a COVID-19 vaccine will be approved in the United States before its
safety and effectiveness are fully understood.”).
206 See, e.g., Parmet, supra note 89, at 131–32 (“[T]he discussion of a possible EUA [for an
H1N1 vaccine], and the decision to license the vaccine without full testing, may have helped
to fuel a public perception that the vaccine was rushed and untested.”); Quinn et al., supra
note 78, at 326 (detailing reports of feeling like “lab rats,” “lab monkey[s],” and “guinea pigs”
from people offered the AVA vaccine).
207 See Zettler et al., supra note 4, at 166 (describing special considerations involved with
EUAs for vaccines).
208 See Lawrence O. Gostin, Law, Ethics, and Public Health in the Vaccination Debates:
Politics of the Measles Outbreak, 313 JAMA 1099, 1099 (2015) (“Clustering [of unvaccinated
people] erodes herd immunity, facilitating disease outbreaks that can spread.”).
209 See id. at 1099–1100 (describing the importance of vaccine compliance in fostering herd
immunity).
201
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Despite these valid concerns, the best solution is not to stop
issuing EUA vaccines, as some critics suggested.210 As
demonstrated by the EUA for AVA, the EUA process can be a
valuable tool for ensuring that particularly high-risk populations
have access to the necessary protections.211 Furthermore, the
COVID-19 vaccines, particularly the eventual approval of the Pfizer
vaccine for individuals sixteen years and older and the Pfizer EUA’s
re-issuances for those ages five through fifteen, demonstrate that
the FDA can successfully integrate rigorous testing standards into
the EUA process.212
In short, vaccines can be critical to ending CBRN emergencies so
that society can return to normal life, and a blanket ban on EUAs
for vaccines could extend the length of CBRNs unnecessarily,
resulting in substantially greater loss of life.213 Nevertheless,
concerns about individual rights and safety of the approved vaccine
should not be discounted, especially when widespread vaccine
compliance is so critical to herd immunity.214
The crux of the controversy surrounding the EUA procedure
stems from the fact that EUA requires a significantly lower degree
of evidence than traditional routes for FDA approval.215 The EUA
procedure requires only that the FDA Commissioner determine that

See, e.g., Zettler et al., supra note 4, at 167 (“FDA should decline to authorize EUAs for
COVID-19 vaccines. . . . Issuance of an EUA for a vaccine that can be used across the entire
population may create unnecessary risks to healthy individuals, and may delay or prevent
completion of clinical trials on vaccine safety and efficacy.”); Cohen, supra note 133 (“Sheldon
Toubman, an attorney on the committee who represents consumers, flat out urged FDA not
to issue an EUA for a COVID-19 vaccine, arguing that the agency should stick to the
traditional approval process.”).
211 See, e.g., Nightingale et al., supra note 37, at 1050 (approving of the AVA EUA for
military use and concluding that “EUA is a critical new tool for the medical and public health
communities and is applicable for both civilian and military use”).
212 See supra notes 137–145, 161–162 and accompanying text.
213 For example, see the predictions made by Borse et al., supra note 94, at 443, regarding
a vaccine’s possible impact during the H1N1 pandemic.
214 See Gostin, supra note 208, at 1099–1100 (discussing how lack of vaccine compliance
can impair herd immunity); Emily Kopp, Experts: Public Trust in Science, Data Key to
(July
14,
2020,
5:49
PM),
COVID-19
Vaccine
Credibility,
ROLL CALL
https://www.rollcall.com/2020/07/14/coronavirus-vaccine-update-experts-public-fdahearings/ (recounting the emphasis placed by health experts on the importance of public trust
in ensuring public compliance with COVID-19 vaccinations).
215 See supra notes 56–66 and accompanying text.
210
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it is “reasonable to believe” that the product “may be effective,”216
unlike the traditional routes for approval that require “substantial
evidence” that the product is “safe and effective” or “pure and
potent.”217 This lower evidentiary burden provides significant
benefits during a PHE when quick, decisive action can save lives
and quell the spread of disease. In times of crisis, the cost-benefit
analysis for FDA authorization shifts markedly from non-crisis
situations; the benefits of authorizing a drug or vaccine with
promising preliminary results can undoubtedly outweigh the risk
when lives are on the line.218 For example, the fast EUA procedure
makes particular sense if the product is already approved for a
different purpose because its potential adverse effects are mostly
known already.219 After EUA issuance, the FDA may find that an
authorized product was ineffective or more harmful than
beneficial.220 The flexibility of the EUA process helps to address this
issue; EUAs are consistently reviewed in light of new data and can
be modified and revoked as needed.221
Issues with the EUA process emerge, however, when the
decision-making process does not appear to be based on sufficient
evidence.222 A lower evidentiary burden provides necessary
discretion to respond to the unique circumstances of a PHE, but
some cognizable evidentiary burden must remain to ensure that the
public is not put at risk without sufficient justification.223 If the bar
is set too low, authorization of a product could put people at
significant risk simply based on anecdotal data and the hope that a
216
217

21 U.S.C. § 360bbb(c)(2); see supra notes 59, 62 and accompanying text.
21 U.S.C. § 355(b), (d); 42 U.S.C. § 262(a); see supra notes 57, 59 and accompanying

text.
218 See 2017 FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 43, at 8 (describing the FDA’s process for
conducting risk-benefit analyses).
219 See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text; infra note 229. This same logic could also
apply to the recently authorized vaccine booster doses, although perhaps to a lesser degree
because the vaccines are currently only authorized rather than approved. See supra note 132
and accompanying text.
220 See, e.g., supra note 110 and accompanying text.
221 See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(g)(2) (authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services
to revise or revoke an EUA under certain circumstances).
222 See, e.g., supra note 108 and accompanying text.
223 Cf. Zettler et al., supra note 4, at 165 (noting the dual pressures on the FDA during a
PHE of generating rigorous evidence of safety and effectiveness while responding to the
“urgent need to move as quickly as possible”).
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product may be effective. An evidentiary standard that is too low
can cause the public to feel like test subjects, and the public may
lose critical trust in the government for the duration of the PHE,
and even after the PHE is over.224
Diagnostic tests, PPE, medical devices, drugs, and biological
products all fall under the same broad EUA procedure, subject to
specified guidance provided by the FDA.225 However, these
categories, especially drugs and biologics, present vastly different
risk-benefit analyses and play clearly distinct roles within a robust
pandemic or bioterror response. EUA drugs are typically acute
treatments, given to people who are severely sick and hospitalized
for a short amount of time.226 Still, these acute treatments have the
potential to do more harm than good to patients if their efficacy or
adverse side effects are completely unknown.227 EUAs of drugs for
acute treatments also raise heightened ethical concerns about
informed consent, access and distribution, and the ability to conduct
further clinical trials.228 EUAs of drugs that have been approved by
the FDA for other purposes present lesser safety concerns,229 but
previously unknown side effects can emerge when a drug is used in
224 See, e.g., Zettler et al., supra note 4, at 165 (“FDA . . . may lose public trust if the agency
is viewed as unresponsive to patients’ concerns.”); Kopp, supra note 214, at 2 (“If a vaccine
was granted emergency authorization and later discovered to have severe side effects and the
authorization was revoked, in the way the emergency use authorization for
hydroxychloroquine was granted and then revoked, experts worry it could not only reduce
COVID-19 vaccination rates but damage vaccination rates for generations.”).
225 See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3 (subjecting “drug[s], device[s], [and] biological product[s]” to
the FDA’s EUA powers).
226 See Zettler et al., supra note 4, at 166 (“A drug that is issued an EUA is typically
administered to a sick person with no other treatment options, whereas a vaccine is
administered to a healthy person.”).
227 See, e.g., Section III.C.1.
228 See Lawrence O. Gostin, Eric A. Friedman & Sarah A. Wetter, Responding to Covid-19:
How to Navigate a Public Health Emergency Legally and Ethically, 50 HASTINGS CTR. REP.
8, 8 (2020) (noting concerns whenever “the health system becomes stretched beyond capacity”
with “ethical[] allocation [of] scarce health goods and services” needed to “ensure that
marginalized populations can access the care they need,” that “ethical duties . . . owe[d] to
vulnerable people separated from their families and communities” are met, and that public
health and civil liberties are “ethically and legally balance[d]”); Zettler et al., supra note 4, at
166 (“Yet another major concern is how to provide fair and equitable access to COVID-19
countermeasures once they are available under an EUA . . . .”).
229 These drugs will already have completed three phases of clinical trials and likely some
post-marketing surveillance. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text.
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a new circumstance.230 Nevertheless, when faced with acute and
severe need, the FDA can, and in many instances should, determine
that the benefits of a drug EUA with promising safety data derived
from reliable preliminary research outweigh the costs.
By contrast, vaccines are administered to people who are healthy
in order to prevent infection.231 This presents a drastically different
set of circumstances and considerations from a drug administered
to a severely ill patient or a diagnostic test that presents no direct
dangers to a patient.232 Vaccines must also be widely distributed
and administered to have a net benefit to the general population.233
A vaccine with low efficacy or unexpected adverse side effects may
undermine public trust in the FDA or vaccines generally, hindering
future public health efforts.234 Vaccines’ preventative effect,
however, can play a key role in combating the spread of disease and
returning society to normal pre-pandemic functioning.235
The FDA inherently recognizes the distinct cost-benefit analyses
of various products when administering EUAs. For example, the
FDA has issued guidance about EUA administration and delineated
different requirements for drugs and biologics at various times.236
However, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the FDA issued this type
of guidance for vaccines too late, following months of speculation
and criticism.237
230 Reflecting this understanding, the FDA approves or authorizes drugs or vaccines for
specific indications and patient populations. See, e.g., note 120 and accompanying text.
231 See Zettler et al., supra note 4, at 166 (discussing the cost-benefit analysis that applies
uniquely to vaccines).
232 See, e.g., Vincent Y. Ling, Emerging Partially Effective Vaccines: Ethical and Policy
Considerations, 6 N.C. CENT. U. SCI. & INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 10 (2013) (detailing ethical
concerns around emergency vaccine authorizations).
233 See, e.g., Kopp, supra note 214 (noting that the spread of anti-vaccine disinformation
negatively affected the distribution and administration of the measles, mumps, and rubella
vaccinations).
234 See id. (“‘The emergence of a serious safety concern related to a COVID-19 vaccine, or
even the perception by the public that corners were cut or political pressure was applied in a
rush to approve it, would be greatly damaging not only to COVID-19 vaccination efforts, but
also to public confidence in all recommended vaccines,’ [one health expert] said.”).
235 See, e.g., supra note 213.
236 See 2017 FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 43, at 11–16 (discussing general types of evidence
typically required for the issuance of an EUA); 2020 VACCINE GUIDANCE, supra note 137, at
3–4 (delineating specific requirements for EUAs for vaccines).
237 See supra Section III.C.4.
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Issuing EUAs for drugs and vaccines during a PHE is critical to
a successful PHE response. Despite the controversies surrounding
some EUAs, the overall procedure effectively achieves its goals by
providing emergency access to potentially life-saving drugs and
vaccines. Nevertheless, the procedure presents possibilities for
positive reform. The following sections propose three possible
reforms to the EUA procedure that would likely benefit the FDA,
the public, and private industry: (1) the EUA procedure should
mandate that the FDA create and disseminate guidance as soon as
practicable after the declaration of a PHE; (2) Congress should
modify the evidentiary standard for vaccine EUAs; and (3) the EUA
procedure should require that the FDA specifically cite which
studies or other evidence it relies upon when deciding to issue an
EUA and release the data underlying its decision.
A. GUIDANCE

The EUA procedure should be modified by congressional
lawmaking or agency rulemaking to require the FDA, upon the
declaration of a PHE, to issue guidance delineating the different
evidentiary standards that it will require companies to meet before
it grants EUAs to vaccines or drugs.238 This guidance should
resemble the EUA guidance that the FDA issued for vaccines during
the COVID-19 pandemic, where the FDA clearly stated the types of
data it required and additional criteria it would impose upon
vaccine manufacturers.239 Although the FDA will face numerous
responsibilities and pressures at the beginning of a pandemic,
establishing these standards should occur as soon as practicable.
These standards should remain non-binding and susceptible to
amendment because the guidance will likely change as the FDA
238 See Herschel Nachlis, The FDA’s Evolving COVID-19 Emergency Use Authorizations:
How the Convalescent Plasma Authorization Can Inform Future Vaccine and Therapeutic
AFFS.
(Oct.
20,
2020),
EUAs,
HEALTH
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20201016.659416/full/ (“The agency could
consider providing greater clarity by updating the current EUA guidance or issuing
additional new guidance outlining different evidentiary standards for different types of
products, and perhaps different standards for therapeutics depending on the populations in
which they will be used.”).
239 See generally 2020 VACCINE GUIDANCE, supra note 137.
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learns more about the CBRN threat. Additionally, the EUA
procedure should require the FDA to evaluate a drug or vaccine
granted an EUA against the guidance and state its justification for
any deviation in the EUA letter. Although the guidance will be
nonbinding, it will provide a standard to which the FDA should
adhere when issuing EUAs.
First, this change will improve the EUA process within the FDA.
Like the FDA’s adherence to the 2020 vaccine EUA guidelines, the
FDA will likely be motivated to follow these guidelines because they
provide consistent standards to pharmaceutical companies and
assurance to the public.240 The requirement will likely reduce the
number of EUAs with low evidentiary support and provide a degree
of protection from political influence because any unusually large
deviation from procedure will be clear and will likely elicit
substantial public pushback. Additionally, the guidance could
accelerate the EUA procedure by clarifying that a drug has met
certain objective minimum requirements, thus setting the
parameters for a quicker and more uniform evaluation of similar
products. The FDA could also use the guidance as a means of
resisting political or public pressure, using the guidance to leverage
and safeguard against attempts to influence the process for
political, rather than health related, reasons.
Second, this requirement will also likely benefit other interested
parties and further public health efforts. Investing in developing
these standards early on will help to educate the public about the
EUA process. This could foster trust in the EUA process because it
will counter the false narrative that the FDA has unfettered
discretion to authorize products.241 Publishing the guidance as soon
as possible after the declaration of an emergency may also reduce
pundits’ speculation about the safety or danger of EUAs generally
because they will have concrete requirements to examine.
Additionally, pharmaceutical companies will benefit from both the
certainty and the increased public trust provided by the guidance.
Public distrust can impact both pharmaceutical companies’ revenue

See supra Section II.C.4.
See, e.g., Zettler et al., supra note 4, at 165–66 (describing the requirements of the EUA
process and the importance of developing rigorous evidence).
240
241
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and, in the case of vaccines, the efficacy of their products.242 The
guidance provides companies with a better explanation of the
evidence that they must gather prior to seeking authorization and
a better idea of their likelihood of successfully obtaining an EUA.
Last, this modification may support more adequately controlled
randomized trials prior to and following authorization because the
guidance will delineate more clearly specified evidentiary
requirements.
This change to the EUA procedure for drugs will ensure that the
FDA retains the flexibility to respond to unforeseen circumstances
while remaining faithful to its guidance in all other circumstances;
however, this change does not adequately address the additional
concerns raised by EUAs for vaccines. The following subsection
addresses these concerns.
B. EUA EVIDENTIARY REQUIREMENTS

Congress should raise the standard for vaccine EUAs above the
“reasonable to believe that . . . the product may be effective”
standard currently used for EUAs243 but below the “substantial
evidence” standard used for traditional approvals.244 An
intermediate standard, such as one requiring the Secretary of
Health and Human Services—and therefore, through delegated
authority, the FDA Commissioner245—to determine that it is
reasonable to believe that the product is effective, could solve this
problem. This threshold imposes a notably higher evidentiary
burden than “may be effective,” but it falls short of requiring
“substantial evidence” of effectiveness.
This change in standard would, from the outset, recognize a
higher evidentiary standard for vaccines while simultaneously
retaining the flexibility of EUAs as opposed to traditional approval.
This change would also help the general public recognize that
vaccine EUAs are held to a high standard and could increase public
242 For example, these concerns likely spurred pharmaceutical companies to pledge to meet
specific evidentiary metrics before applying for a vaccine EUA. See supra notes 135, 207–208
and accompanying text.
243 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(c).
244 Id. § 355(d)–(e).
245 See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text.
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trust in a potential vaccine.246 This higher evidentiary burden
simply reflects the truth tacitly recognized by the FDA, public
health experts, and the public regarding vaccines: the relatively
amorphous promise that they “may be effective” is not sufficient to
justify their authorization.
Some might argue that this modification is too drastic and would
place too large a burden on the FDA during a crisis when quick
action is necessary. This modification, however, would not greatly
change the higher burden that the FDA created for itself in the 2020
vaccine guidelines.247 Rather, it would clearly indicate to the public
that vaccines may go through an expedited review and development
process during a PHE, but any authorized vaccine is still subject to
rigorous safety and efficacy tests.
This change would also help to safeguard against any political
pressure that the FDA might face to approve a vaccine before
sufficient data is available. Under the current standard, the FDA
Commissioner could authorize a vaccine based on a very small
amount of evidence.248 While this is unlikely to occur, the current
standard creates an atmosphere ripe for speculation, influence, and
public mistrust.249 Explicitly requiring reasonable belief that the
product is effective would remedy this problem without unduly
impeding vaccine authorizations.
Both the AVA vaccine and the two coronavirus vaccines would
pass this heightened evidentiary requirement. The AVA vaccine
EUA was issued based on years of testing and development
indicating that it would be effective,250 and the coronavirus vaccines
adhered to the FDA’s vaccine guidance that required specific
metrics of evidence beyond those required by the general EUA
Despite this improvement, some increased fear will likely always remain whenever a
vaccine falls short of traditional FDA approval.
247 See 2020 VACCINE GUIDANCE, supra note 137, at 9–11 (enumerating the various safety
and effectiveness criteria that companies must meet prior to emergency use authorization).
248 The FDA Commissioner must determine that it “is reasonable to believe” that the
authorized product “may be effective” and can rely upon the “totality of scientific evidence,”
rather than only on clinical trials. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(c)(2); see also supra Section II.C.
249 For example, President Trump’s unwavering public support for hydroxychloroquine
raised concerns about the FDA’s independence. See supra notes 100–101 (listing comments
made by President Trump and fears about the FDA succumbing to political influence).
250 See Quinn et al., supra note 78, at 322 (providing a timeline of AVA vaccine research
from 1999 to 2001).
246
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standard.251 Formally recognizing a heightened requirement for
vaccines provides a number of benefits without unduly burdening
the FDA or slowing public health efforts.
C. TRANSPARENCY

Unfortunately, any major EUA decision involving a drug or
biologic is susceptible to politicization.252 Although the FDA’s focus
is, rightly, on evaluating the data before issuing an EUA, the FDA
should recognize its increased political salience during a pandemic
or bioterror attack. Although it is always desirable to maintain
public trust in governmental agencies, especially public health
agencies, public trust during a pandemic can particularly impact
public health outcomes.253 While it is nearly impossible to fully
explain all scientific procedures, trials, and analyses to the general
public, continual and accurate public communication is critical. Two
changes to FDA EUA operating procedures could improve
transparency and public communication during EUA issuance.
First, when issuing an EUA, the FDA should be required to
explicitly reference the evidence that it relied upon when deciding
whether to issue the EUA. Unlike the hydroxychloroquine EUA,
which vaguely referenced “limited in-vitro and anecdotal clinical
data in case series” and “a number of national guidelines,”254 EUAs
should state the specific studies or guidelines to which they refer.255
This requirement would increase transparency in the FDA’s
decision-making process and allow other public health experts to
examine the evidence for themselves. This measure will give the
public a better understanding of EUAs and allow the scientific
See supra Section III.C.4.
See, e.g., supra notes 133–135 and accompanying text.
253 See Julie Henderson et al., Developing and Maintaining Public Trust During and PostCOVID-19: Can We Apply a Model Developed for Responding to Food Scares?, FRONTIERS PUB.
HEALTH, July 2020, at 1–2 (highlighting the importance of trust in public health
countermeasures during epidemics).
254 Chloroquine and Hydroxychloroquine EUA, supra note 102, at 2.
255 See Scott Burris et al., Summary of Recommendations for Assuring Access to Medicines
and Medical Supplies, in ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 4, at 149,
150 (“Congress and FDA should consider creating specific processes to protect decision
making during pandemics, such as requiring FDA to proactively release detailed information
about the basis for its EUA decisions immediately after they are made.”).
251
252
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community to hold the FDA accountable, should it rely upon faulty
data.
Second, the FDA should be required to release the data
underlying its decision to grant the EUA if the data is not currently
available. This will prevent another circumstance like the
remdesivir EUA, which referenced a particular efficacy statistic but
provided no further data to put the statistic into context.256 This
requirement will provide an additional incentive for the FDA to
make certain that the data it uses are reliable, allow the scientific
community to hold the FDA accountable, and ensure healthcare
providers understand how to best administer the authorized
product as soon as the product is authorized.
Third, making this information available may also decrease the
amount of speculation about the FDA’s political motivations or
other factors that might influence its decision-making and may
increase the public’s confidence in the agency.257 These changes
recognize that during an emergency, governmental transparency is
particularly important. Especially during a time of wild uncertainty
like a PHE, the public should know what evidence the FDA relies
upon in making its EUA decisions.

V. CONCLUSION
The COVID-19 pandemic has emphasized the important role
that the EUA procedure plays in a comprehensive CBRN emergency
response. The procedure has faced criticism, however, due to its low
evidentiary burden and concerns with political interference.258 This
Note proposes modifications to Section 564 of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act; FDA regulations; and FDA operating
procedure.
At the outset of a PHE response, the EUA procedure should
require the FDA to draft guidance outlining the differing
evidentiary burdens for the issuance of EUAs for drugs, vaccines,
and other biologics. Additionally, Congress should alter the EUA
See supra notes 115–117 and accompanying text.
Cf. Kopp, supra note 214 (noting that anti-vaccine conspiracy theories contributed to
the rise in a number of diseases such as measles and mumps).
258 See, e.g., Piller, supra note 3 (describing criticism by former FDA officials of the
hydroxychloroquine EUA).
256
257
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evidentiary burden for vaccines from the “reasonable to believe
that” the vaccine “may be effective” standard259 to an intermediate
“reasonable to believe” that the vaccine “is effective” standard.
Furthermore, every EUA letter should specifically cite the data
upon which it relies, and this data should be released as soon as
practicable. These changes might not transform FDA officials into
the crime-fighting agents of S.H.I.E.L.D.,260 but the changes will
enable them to more effectively become what we truly need during
a PHE: agents of Bioshield.

21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(c).
Like FDA officials during a PHE, the Agents of S.H.I.E.L.D. are a “small, highly trained,
team of agents” who “tackle the cases that haven’t been classified yet, the new, the strange
and the unknown.” Agents of S.H.I.E.L.D., MARVEL CINEMATIC UNIVERSE WIKI,
https://marvelcinematicuniverse.fandom.com/wiki/Agents_of_S.H.I.E.L.D. (last visited Nov.
2, 2021).
259
260
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APPENDIX: ACRONYMS
AVA
BARDA
BLA
CDC
CDER
CBER
CBRN
DoD
EUA
FDA
FDCA
HHS
IND
IRB
NDA
NIAID
NIH
PHE
PHSA
PPE
VRBPAC
VAERS
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Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed
Biomedical Advanced Research
and Development Authority
Biologics License Application
Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention
Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research
Center for Biologics Evaluation
and Research
Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear
Department of Defense
Emergency Use Authorization
Food and Drug Administration
Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act
Health and Human Services
Investigational New Drug
Institutional Review Board
New Drug Application
National Institute of Allergy
and Infection Disease
National Institutes of Health
Public Health Emergency
Public Health Service Act
Personal Protective Equipment
Vaccines and Related Biological
Products Advisory Committee
Vaccine Adverse Event
Reporting System
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